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Executive Summary 
The purpose of this EU deliverable is to translate insights gained during the RESPONSES project 
into guidance of relevance for the practice of policy appraisal. Rather than simply summarize 
results by policy sector, which is how the RESPONSES project was organized, we identify six sets 
of cross-sectoral concerns. 
A. Procedural requirements for policy appraisal 
Policy appraisal can include both formal and informal processes for analyzing the consequences 
of a decision. With respect to the former, the EU requires impact assessment (IA), strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA), and environmental impact assessments (EIA) at various stages 
in the policy process. Examining those three, we conclude: 
1. The climate change mitigation and adaptation impacts of European measures are 
beginning to be considered in impact assessment and strategic environmental 
assessment, but the practice is still highly uneven. 
2. Guidance on integrating climate issues into policy appraisal is currently voluntary and 
non-binding; introducing clear mandates and constraints would provide a harder edge to 
climate appraisal. 
3. Appraisal is currently ‘front loaded’ in EU sectoral policy cycles. The need for more 
adaptive management of climate-related risks suggests a rebalancing towards a greater 
emphasis on monitoring, assessment and learning throughout the policy cycle. 
B. Appraising the consistency of policy proposals with future emission reduction targets 
European policy makers are currently planning how to transform the continent's energy sector 
into one that produces no net greenhouse gas emissions, by the third quarter of this century. 
Proposals for projects, programmes, and policies outside of the energy sector could play an 
important role in facilitating this transformation, but they could also hinder it. RESPONSES 
research suggests that in appraising such proposals the following factors are important: 
1. The effects on total energy demand are one consideration, but decoupling energy use 
from greenhouse gas emissions is more important. 
2. Appraisal should consider the extent to which a proposed action reduces demand for 
liquid or gaseous fuels, or shifts energy demand from fuels to electricity. 
3. In the next few years, once EU policy makers have made important choices concerning 
particular technologies for decarbonization, it will be possible to more clearly appraise 
whether other policies or proposals are consistent with changes in the architecture of the 
energy system. 
C. Treatment of the 2°C target within policy appraisal 
It is the express policy of the EU and its institutions to prevent climate change from exceeding 
2°C average warming above pre-industrial temperatures. Whether this occurs, however, is largely 
out of EU policy-makers’ control, and there are reasons to believe that temperature rise will 
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exceed this value. Relevant for the practice of policy appraisal, RESPONSES researchers have 
reached the following conclusions: 
1. Even in relatively progressive jurisdictions, there is evidence that adaptation planners in 
key sectors insufficiently take into account the prospect of more extreme levels of 
warming than 2°C in their day-to-day work. 
2. There is reason for concern about the validity of current and past policy appraisals, 
because of a widespread failure to consider the robustness of proposed actions to 
conditions associated with warming far greater than 2°C. 
3. The results of independently conducted assessments of climate impacts in different 
sectors are often not transparent, comparable or transferable. 
D. Adaptation goals in the context of policy appraisal 
In appraising whether a particular policy proposal is furthering key adaptation objectives within 
Europe and the member states, a non-trivial problem is identifying what those objectives actually 
are. RESPONSES research has shown that these goals are not constant across policy sectors, 
countries, or time, and suggests the following insights: 
1. Adaptation goals range from conservative (securing existing policy objectives under 
conditions of climate change) to transformative (reformulating policy objectives given 
what is feasible and desirable under conditions of climate change). 
2. Given high uncertainty, the identification of adaptation goals and strategies may need to 
be devolved to lower levels of governance. 
E. Dealing with uncertainty in the context of policy appraisal 
In the area of climate policy, decision-makers are confronted with numerous and often cascading 
uncertainties, all of which can make it very difficult to say what the climate will look like in the 
future, how it will affect people, and what responses are most important. RESPONSES researchers 
have examined this problem in the context of policy appraisal, and suggest the following 
insights: 
1. Uncertainties in future climate impacts are unevenly distributed, implying a need for 
geographical and temporal specificity in the practice of policy appraisal. 
2. Formalized tools to identify optimal strategies under conditions of uncertainty require too 
much data to be practical, and hence analysis may want to focus instead on identifying 
qualitatively robust strategies. 
3. Uncertainties in social systems, rather than the climate, may dominate the type of 
adaptation that is needed and possible; appraisals need to keep an open mind concerning 
what adaptation actions take place ‘down the road’. 
F. Considering vulnerability and adaptive capacity in policy appraisal 
The academic literature on adaptation makes clear that in many places, the most productive 
policies are not those that directly respond to an anticipated climate impact, but rather that 
change the conditions creating an underlying vulnerability, such as by empowering people to be 
more adaptive in their daily practices. The RESPONSES team has examined this notion within the 
context of policy appraisal, arriving at the following insights: 
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1. Vulnerability reduction is less important in the European context than it is globally, 
primarily because extreme poverty and its associated vulnerabilities are largely absent. 
2. Adaptive capacity and sensitivity vary across regions, and indeed many newer EU member 
states lack the capacity to develop effective adaptation plans. 
3. Local decision-making capacities often matter the most, and hence policy appraisal can 
focus on the extent to which a proposed policy will enhance or reduce decision-making 
capacity at the local level. 
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1 Introduction 
The RESPONSES project aimed to provide strategic input for European policy-makers as they 
integrate climate adaptation and mitigation concerns into programming, policy-development, and 
decision-making. The project looked at EU policies in five sectors—water and agriculture, 
biodiversity, regional development and infrastructure, health, and energy—where adaptation and 
mitigation mainstreaming issues and options can be appraised and tested. Drawing on insights 
from across the five policy sectors, this report highlights five substantive issues for policy 
assessment and appraisal as it relates to climate change. In addition to these substantive issues, 
it also reflects on the procedural aspects of assessment and appraisal. 
In dealing with a complex, dynamic and uncertain issue like climate change, there is a special 
role for assessment and appraisal, not only in framing policies at the start, but also in enabling 
learning about what works through the policy cycle. Our aim in this report is to build on existing 
policy assessment and appraisal processes in the EU. After over 20 years of development this is a 
mature system, which now needs to be adapted to the challenges of greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions and building resilience to the impacts of climate variability and change. 
We begin by describing the existing state of policy appraisal in Europe, and the extent to which 
appraisals already include a consideration of climate policy concerns. We evaluate whether there 
is a need to overhaul such appraisal practices, such as by extending the range of decisions for 
which appraisal is required, changing the role of appraisal within decision-making processes, or 
mandating particular climate-specific indicators or impacts for such appraisals to quantify. While 
highlighting a number of weaknesses, we conclude that there is no short-term need for major 
reform. Rather, there are a number of substantive issues that are conceptually problematic, and 
for which additional guidance would be valuable. The remainder of this report provides such 
guidance.    
We highlight five key issues covering a range of questions across the spectrum of mitigation and 
adaptation: 
 How can one appraise consistency of a proposed policy with the European goal of deep 
emissions cuts? The challenge here is that deep cuts imply a transformation of the 
European energy system, whereas appraisal will often be concerned with a more limited 
review of a policy or programme. 
 How ought one to reconcile the European target of mitigating CO2 emissions so as not to 
surpass 2°C global average warming with the fact that this target is likely to be exceeded? 
Beyond 2°C average warming by the end of this century is a plausible outcome given 
global emissions trajectories, and this needs to be considered in EU adaptation planning. 
 When appraising the consistency of proposed interventions with European adaptation 
goals, what in fact are those goals? The goal of adaptation is normally seen as making 
adjustments to secure current policy objectives, but this may in some cases require an 
impracticable level of adaptation effort, forcing a deeper reconsideration of the policy 
objectives themselves. 
 How ought one to deal with high levels of uncertainty when appraising consistency with 
European adaptation goals? Assessments of vulnerability to climate change will continue 
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to be faced with a large measure of uncertainty, and this will shape how climate-related 
risks are handled in future. 
 When appraising consistency with European adaptation goals, what is the importance of 
adaptive capacity? Most adaptation will be done by private actors operating in the context 
of available knowledge, resources and networks; but these adaptive capacities vary 
greatly across Europe, something public policies can address. 
  
 8 
 
 RESPONSES Project 244092  Strategic Climate Assessment Approach    
2 Appraisal practices in Europe 
2.1 Introduction 
Policy appraisal is concerned with understanding the impacts of a core task of the European 
Commission– the design, codification and implementation of public policy. Monitoring and 
appraisal are among a variety of procedures available to policymakers as they seek to integrate 
climate change considerations in the design and implementation of policy. Different forms of 
monitoring, reporting and appraisal can be applied at different stages of the EU policy cycle (see 
Figure 1 for the example of Cohesion Policy). Here we use a broad definition of appraisal to 
include all those procedures in policy design and implementation involving a technical 
assessment that can be seen as guiding the allocation of public resources or the regulation of 
activities.1 Appraisal therefore needs to be seen as embedded in a specific policymaking context 
and as a continuous activity throughout the policy cycle. Making a sharp distinction between 
procedures involving appraisal and those that do not can be misleading. Some level of 
assessment is intrinsic to all stages of policymaking. Moreover, each policy sector will have its 
own reporting and appraisal requirements. For instance, the Habitats Directive (1992) requires an 
‘appropriate assessment’ to be done of all plans and projects that may have a significant effect 
on a protected site, with the express aim of preventing development that could endanger such 
sites. In addition to this there are formal and generic appraisal procedures for EU policies, 
programmes and projects, and these are the focus here. 
Ex ante appraisal of the impacts of policies, programmes, plans and projects is an important part 
of European policy and decision-making. Within the EU there are a number of routine procedures. 
Here we review briefly impact assessment (applied to all EU legislative proposals with significant 
economic, social, environmental impacts) and strategic environmental assessment (applied to 
‘plans and programmes’ of national governments, especially in relation to land use planning). 
Environmental Impact Assessment relates to specific projects, and is applied whether or not they 
receive EU funding. We conclude with three insights about integrating climate into EU appraisal 
instruments, and extending monitoring and evaluation to support more adaptive management 
approaches. 
                                                            
1 Detailed comment on the relevance of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis (CBA and 
CEA) can be found in Responses Deliverable 9.5. 
 9 
 
 RESPONSES Project 244092  Strategic Climate Assessment Approach    
 
Figure 1  Appraisal in the context of climate mainstreaming procedures through the policy 
cycle: the case of Cohesion Policy (all appraisal procedures in bold, formal appraisal 
instruments in red). 
2.2 Impact Assessment in the European Commission 
Impact Assessment (IA) in the European Commission is about a decade old. Originally, the 
Commission put forward IA as a “tool to improve the quality and coherence of the policy 
development process” (European Commission, 2002: 2). In doing so, it made clear that impact 
assessment did not replace political judgment. Its importance for mainstreaming has been 
highlighted by, among others, Pollack and Hafner-Burton (2010), in that IA: 
 Encourages wide involvement of Commission services and other stakeholders. 
 Is intended to reflect on policy objectives, impacts of options, developing alternative 
options, assessing impacts, and recommending a preferred option (if possible). 
 Has potential to provide ‘hard incentives’ to bureaucrats to implement mainstreaming (if 
appropriately strong quality control systems are in place). 
2.2.1 Scope and practice 
IA applies to all major Commission initiatives, defined as “…all legislative proposals of the 
Commission's Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP) and …all non-CLWP legislative proposals 
which have clearly identifiable economic, social and environmental impacts (with the exception of 
routine implementing legislation) and for non-legislative initiatives (such as white papers, action 
plans, expenditure programmes, negotiating guidelines for international agreements) which 
define future policies” (EC, 2009: 6). In other words, more or less the full range of Commission 
activities, as long as they are likely to have significant impacts, will be subject to IA. During an 
initial ‘screening’ stage, decisions are made on whether a proposal needs to have an IA and, if it 
does, what aspects the assessment should cover. 
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The Directorate General (DG) within the Commission responsible for the proposal or initiative is 
also responsible for the corresponding IA. IAs consist of a number of stages, but issues of scope 
and specific approach must be proportionate and are left open to discretion (see Figure 2). 
Guidance on how to conduct IAs is evolving. Since its initial launch in 2002, guidance has been 
revised twice, in 2005 and 2009, the most recent revision incorporating a reference to adaptation 
to climate change (European Commission 2009: 37). 
The guidance offers best practice examples to guide those conducting the assessments. In the 
central ‘impact analysis’ stage, a number of key questions are suggested under the three 
different pillars of sustainability: economic, social and environmental. In the 2009 IA Guidance, 
some consideration is given to climate change under the environment heading, with three open 
questions covering mitigation and adaptation: 
 Does the option affect the emission of greenhouse gases (e.g. carbon dioxide, methane 
etc.) into the atmosphere?  
 Does the option affect the emission of ozone-depleting substances (CFCs, HCFCs )?  
 Does the option affect our ability to adapt to climate change? 
 
 
Figure 2  Stages in IA (EC, 2009: 5). 
The Commission phased in the use of impact assessment. In 2006, they created the Impact 
Assessment Board (IAB) in order to improve the quality of impact assessments. The IAB reviews 
draft IAs, and returns these for improvements if it judges the first attempt to be unsatisfactory. 
Through 2010, the IAB had considered 382 Impact Assessments, of which roughly two-thirds 
were legislative proposals, and the remaining non-legislative such as white papers. Its level of 
scrutiny appears have to grown more stringent, as the resubmission rate (the proportion of 
Impact Assessments for which the IAB requests improvements) has risen from 9% in 2007 to 42% 
in 2010 (Impact Assessment Board, 2011). 
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2.2.2 Mainstreaming climate change in Impact Assessments 
There is an age-old saying: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  If one is interested in making sure that 
policy-makers are adequately mainstreaming climate concerns in the process of IA, and is 
considering changing IA to this end, then it is essential first to look at the extent to which climate 
concerns are presently omitted. Towards this end, we examined how climate change was covered 
by eleven impact assessments of Commission initiatives (listed in Table 1). These legislative and 
non-legislative proposals all had implications for climate mitigation or adaptation, covered the 
five policy sectors assessed by the RESPONSES project, and were conducted over a period 
spanning the 2009 revision of the IA Guidelines. This allowed some consideration of whether the 
new guidance had affected the way in which climate issues were handled in the assessment. A 
number of criteria were used to analyse the content and coverage of the assessments. 
Table 1  Impact assessments of EC proposals and initiatives reviewed for their handling of 
climate change (Adeler, 2011). 
 
This analysis showed a great deal of diversity in the depth and handling of climate change across 
of IAs (see Figure 3, Adeler, 2011). For instance, while some considered mitigation and 
adaptation measures, nearly half considered neither. Quite a large number of assessments 
acknowledged trade-offs and synergies, either between mitigation and adaptation, or between 
climate-related actions and traditional sectoral objectives. But these tended not to be considered 
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in great depth. Only two of the assessments reviewed dealt with the uncertainties associated with 
climate change impacts. Part of this heterogeneity is explained by the domain-specificity of the 
assessments, but it is also an outcome of the considerable discretion available in the assessment 
process. No clear changes were evident in the handling of topics between the IAs conducted 
before and after the 2009 IA guidance revision (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3  Topics covered in eleven IAs of climate-relevant EC proposals (2006-2011). 
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Figure 4  Comparison of the coverage of topics between pre-2009 and post-2009 impact 
assessments of climate-relevant EC proposals. 
During an initial ‘screening’ stage, decisions are made on whether a proposal needs to have an IA 
and, if it does, what aspects the assessment should cover. The wider literature has found a mixed 
picture. It appears that the type of evidence deemed relevant to IA and the way it is interpreted 
depends to a large extent on the relative power of different DGs involved in the inter-service 
working groups that oversee the production of IAs. Timing of the IA report preparation can also 
be significant in determining whether or not the assessment can have a ‘contributing’ impact on 
the policy process, or whether it plays more of a ‘legitimising’ function (Thiel, 2009). Hirchl et al. 
(2012) examined the role of scientific evidence and impact assessments in the policy process 
leading up to the adoption of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive. Their analysis clearly shows 
that several scientific analyses pointed to a number of risks linked with the massive expansion of 
first-generation biofuels production. They explain the failure of this opinion to be represented in 
the assessment as being due to the different ways of framing and interpreting uncertainty, noting 
how the framings adopted in the report downplayed the negative aspects of a policy proposal 
that had powerful backers in DG Agri and DG Ener. Avoiding these value-contests in appraisal 
remains a major challenge. 
2.3 Strategic environmental assessment 
Europe has a two-tier system for environmental assessment of planning decisions. At the discrete 
project level, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) has been mandated since 1985 
(85/337/EEC). This is what would need to be done when a project with significant expected 
impacts, such as a roadway, is built.  
 14 
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Since 2001, a directive (2001/42/EC) has required environmental assessment earlier in the policy 
process, namely at the time at which authorities are developing strategic plans or programs: 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA). There is also an SEA protocol (2003) that is separate 
from the EU, associated with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), which 
binds member countries to roughly the same procedures as the SEA Directive. 
SEA is what would be required as a ‘competent authority’ is planning or programming at a more 
strategic level, for example, a strategic evaluation of its road infrastructure and transportation 
planning, or river basin management. Legally, an assessment report needs to be prepared before 
a decision is adopted. Ideally, to maximize its influence, it should be carried out in parallel with 
the development of a strategic plan or programme. As with Impact Assessment, SEA needs to 
identify the objectives of the proposed action. It then needs to provide information on: 
 The present environmental situation, including existing problems, and its likely evolution 
without the new plan; 
 The environmental attributes that would likely be affected by the new plan; 
 The existing environmental objectives agreed at the Member State or European level; 
 Possible significant effects on the biodiversity, population, human health, flora and fauna, 
soil, water, air, climate, material assets, cultural heritage, and landscape; 
 The measures to prevent negative impacts; 
 Alternative options to proposed plan; and 
 Needs for additional information and data monitoring. 
As with Commission-level Impact Assessment, SEA needs to include public consultation, and 
follow a process that allows and encourages stakeholder participation. 
Previous reviews have judged that climate change issues were poorly addressed in SEAs (COWI, 
2009). This is also the case for the programmes that SEAs review. As an example, we examined 
National Strategic Reference Frameworks (NSRF), required under EU Cohesion policy, and found 
something similar. Of 17 NSRFs analysed, only seven referenced national climate emissions 
reduction plans, while only three referred to a national adaptation strategy, although six noted 
the need for adaptation to be accounted for in EU-funded projects. 
This patchy coverage, across a range of sectors, is despite a growing amount of additional 
guidance, at both the European level and in some member states. For instance, Scottish National 
Heritage, the body responsible for implementing the Habitats Directive in Scotland, has recently 
published guidance on appropriate appraisal of plans or projects under the directive (Scottish 
Heritage, 2012). Likewise the Commission issued guidance in 2009 related to the Water 
Framework Directive under which member states are encouraged to do a ‘climate check’ of 
proposed measures in new River Basin Management Plans (Wright et al. 2011). The Commission 
is due to publish two sets of guidance on integrating climate change and biodiversity into SEA 
and EIA. This guidance suggests a much more comprehensive treatment of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in EIAs and SEAs, with a longer set of ‘guiding questions’ to de dealt 
with (Figure 5). 
One explanation of a poor take-up of guidance may be lack of awareness. Our study of climate 
mainstreaming among managers in European river basins, found that although there was broad 
awareness of climate-related impacts on water flows and temperatures, posing risks for the 
‘ecological status’ of surface waters, as well as a local capacity to assess and respond to such 
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risks, there was little awareness of European guidance (Brouwer et al., 2013). This may also be 
because the guidance itself is ambiguous about the significance of climate change impacts over 
the timeframe of the Water Framework Directive, in this case targeted to those developing river 
basin management plans. 
 
Figure 5  Draft guiding questions from SEA Practical Guidance (2011). 
2.4 Key insights from the RESPONSES Project 
Insight 1:  The climate change mitigation and adaptation impacts of European measures are 
beginning to be considered in impact assessment and strategic environmental assessment, 
but the practice is still highly uneven 
While in some EU policy sectors, including cohesion, agriculture, biodiversity and water, 
there is widespread awareness of the potential to contribute either to emissions reduction or 
reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts, the practical expression of this in formal 
EU appraisal practice remains quite limited. They are expressed primarily in the non-binding, 
normative appeal of ‘key questions’ that guidance documents suggest ought to be 
considered in IA and SEA. Such guidance is becoming more detailed with respect to GHG 
emissions reduction and climate vulnerability and adaptation. Awareness of guidance 
remains an issue. Lack of consensus on future climate impacts also presents a ‘cognitive 
barrier’ to procedural mainstreaming (Larsen and Kornov, 2009).  
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But even where there is awareness and a good knowledge base, inclusion of climate dimensions 
of plans and programmes will be determined by institutional capacity, the balance of interests 
and the existence of external factors that provide opportunities for ‘win-wins’ in pursuing climate 
mitigation and adaptation. 
Insight 2: Guidance on integrating climate issues into policy appraisal is currently voluntary 
and non-binding; introducing clear mandates and constraints would provide a harder edge 
to climate appraisal 
While IA and SEA are required in law, the findings cannot normally be challenged in court. There 
also exists a large measure of discretion in the conduct of appraisals. Guidance is non-binding 
and voluntary with the goal of encouraging appraisals that attract the broadest possible 
participation and are ‘fit for purpose’. The danger is that without clear mandates or constraints (a 
shift that has been successfully made in biodiversity appraisals in the United States (Farber et al., 
2011)), appraisals will be subject too much to political negotiation about what evidence is 
gathered, how it is interpreted and the consequences for substance of policies, programmes and 
plans. Since IA and SEA are ‘advisory assessments’ their impact on final plans, decisions and 
investments remains ambiguous. It is clear that many opportunities for emissions reductions are 
not being taken and that potentially maladaptive decisions may be proceeding (including, 
support for large reservoirs, biofuels and structural funding on potentially vulnerable 
infrastructures). 
Insight 3: Appraisal is currently ‘front loaded’ in EU sectoral policy cycles. The need for 
more adaptive management of climate-related risks suggests a rebalancing towards a 
greater emphasis on monitoring, assessment and learning throughout the policy cycle 
Conventionally, EU policy appraisal is done before a new piece of legislation or funding allocation 
is made. It operates as a filter before choices are finally made. Ex post appraisals of policy 
effectiveness are done in the run-up to periodic decisions about funding allocations, such as the 
Multiannual Financial Framework, and while proposals are being prepared for policy revision. 
Such assessments are explicitly intended to prefigure policy change, being less concerned with 
experimenting and learning as a policy unfolds. Given the need for learning in respect of a 
transition to a low carbon economy, and since there are many uncertainties about climate 
impacts and adaptation responses, many commentators believe that there is a growing case for a 
more ‘adaptive’ approach to policy design and implementation. One of the prerequisites of 
adaptive governance is the monitoring and appraisal of existing policy ex durante and ex post. 
The capacity to learn is intrinsic to the capacity to adapt, and therefore needs to be built into 
design and timing of policy appraisals at EU, national and local levels. A greater degree of ex 
durante assessment might also operate as a safeguard against policies that are implemented in 
advance of clear scientific input regarding some of their detrimental effects, such as biofuels 
policy (Dunlop, 2010). 
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3 Appraising consistency of policies with deep emissions 
cuts 
Among the many goals and targets that show up in EU climate policy, perhaps the most 
important—and likely most difficult to achieve—is to mitigate greenhouse gases to the extent 
necessary to prevent total average warming over preindustrial times exceeding 2°C. In the 
following section we will deal with the particular challenges for appraisal that the possible—some 
would say inevitable—failure to meet that target creates. In this section, however, we deal with 
the implications of that target, taken at face value, for appraising consistency of policy measures 
with climate policy goals. 
3.1 Implications of the 2°C target 
A cursory review of a number of assessments—IA, EIA, and SEA—reveals that they have looked at 
the mitigation aspects of a broad range of sectoral policies. The main factor assessed in these 
assessments has been whether the given policy or project will reduce the consumption of energy. 
Moreover, in the draft guidance notes for evaluating climate impacts in EIA and SEA, the need for 
a progressive reduction in CO2 emissions is stressed. But how can one assess such a decline in 
emissions? Most of the assessments we have examined did so by noting the marginal change in 
energy use associated with the implementation of the policy under consideration, and then 
translating this into tons of CO2 saved, assuming a particular carbon intensity to the energy 
system (Ecologic 2007). 
From a short-term perspective this makes perfect sense. Two types of changes can lead to 
emissions reductions in the energy sector: reducing total energy use, such as through 
improvements in energy efficiency, or decoupling the provision of energy from greenhouse gas 
emissions. If the needed emissions reductions were of the order of 10, 20, or even 30%, 
improvements in energy efficiency could suffice. Moreover, it seems logical that policy proposals 
outside the energy sector could have a direct impact on total energy use, but little impact on the 
form of energy that is used. Consider, for example, a proposal to harmonize education 
throughout the EU. That could lead to greater mobility of students, and hence more travel. 
Perhaps it could also facilitate the exchange of academic faculty, lessening the overall need for 
students to travel. Both would imply impacts on total energy use. It would likely not contain, 
however, any specification of whether that travel be powered by biofuels or fossil fuels. 
From a longer-term perspective, it is this latter type of issue that is most important. In its Fourth 
Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) analyzed what it 
would take to achieve the 2°C target that the EU—and many other jurisdictions—have set (Metz et 
al. 2007). A new very low emissions scenario developed in the RESPONSES project (Deetman et 
al., 2012b) also shows a need for a fully-decarbonised European energy system by the third 
quarter of this century, with a possible need for a period of negative emissions (i.e. actively 
removing CO2 from the atmosphere and sequestering it somewhere) for several decades 
thereafter. To stand a chance of eliminating emissions on time, the IPCC suggested further, it 
would be prudent to set a target for 2050 of halving emissions globally. Given both equity and 
efficiency concerns, the IPCC concluded, the emissions reductions by 2050 would be 
concentrated in industrialized countries. Developing countries, where per capita emissions are 
much lower to begin with, would need to reduce their emissions by something less than 50%, 
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while the industrialized countries would need to reduce their emissions by at least 80%. More 
recent analysis has confirmed these figures (Hulme and Neufeldt 2010). 
Given a long-term target of over 100% emissions reduction, it is clear that there will have to be a 
complete decoupling of energy from emissions. Once such a decoupling has occurred, there may 
be other environmental or social reasons to limit total energy use, but there is no direct link 
between energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. The primary factor determining the 
achievement of the 2°C target, then, is the pace at which a complete decoupling can occur. Of 
secondary importance are the total emissions generated while such a decoupling is underway. 
These emissions do depend, to some extent, on total energy use and energy efficiency. 
Hence, appraising the consistency of proposed actions with EU climate goals based on the effects 
on total energy use is not irrelevant, but it does miss the main part of the problem: whether a 
given policy or action is consistent with efforts to decouple emissions from energy use. It seems 
clear that policies outside the energy sector are unlikely to have a direct impact on the mix of 
fossil fuels versus other energy sources. There is good reason to believe, however, that they 
could have profound indirect effects. To understand these, it is important to think a little bit 
about the energy system of the future. 
3.2 How will Europe decouple energy use from greenhouse gas emissions? 
The European energy sector is divided roughly evenly between electricity production and use, 
transportation powered by liquid fuels, and heating and industrial processes powered by solid, 
liquid, and gaseous fuels (Schellekens et al. 2010). Creating non-fossil substitutes for liquid and 
gaseous fuels requires the use of biomass, and there are multiple concerns with scaling up this 
practice too far or two quickly: that it will lead to land degradation, and a spike in CO2 emissions 
because of freed-up soil carbon; that it will require unsustainable supplies of fresh water for 
irrigation, draining underground aquifers; and, that it will compete with food production, leading 
to higher food prices, and widespread hunger among the world’s poor (IPCC 2011). By contrast, 
substituting renewable sources for the coal, oil, and gas used to generate electricity faces 
relatively fewer constraints. Globally, the economic potentials of both wind and solar power 
outstrip total energy demand, in the case of solar power by more than an order of magnitude 
(IPCC 2011; de Vries, van Vuuren, and Hoogwijk 2007). Nuclear fission already generates a large 
share of electricity in some countries, and it may be possible to expand this. Carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) offers the possibility of eliminating up to 95% of the CO2 emissions from large 
point sources, and large point sources are primarily coal- and gas-fired electricity generators 
(Metz et al. 2005). Hence, three requirements emerge: 
 Substituting bio-fuels for oil and gas in the transportation and heating sectors; 
 Reducing the consumption of bio-fuels to sustainable rates through a combination of 
efficiency improvements and electrification;2 and 
 Eliminating net CO2 emissions from the production of electricity. 
                                                            
2 In addition to electrification, basic chemistry and numerous sets of analysis suggest that one could also use 
hydrogen as a fuel, provided that hydrogen is produced in a carbon neutral manner. In practice, the two are to a 
large extent equivalent, as hydrogen can be viewed as a way of storing electricity, with a hydrogen fuel cell being 
equivalent to a battery. 
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Researchers in the RESPONSES project have examined all three of these options, primarily 
through the use of integrated assessment and energy system models. Of tremendous importance 
for European climate policy, but not necessarily for the practice of mainstreaming climate 
concerns into the appraisal of policy proposals more generally, they have found that 
implementing them at a pace necessary to achieve the 2°C target is technically possible but would 
require massive changes in investment, that the needed changes in investment may be so large 
and so disruptive that there may be reason to reevaluate the 2°C target in the first place 
(Deetman et al. 2012a, 2012b, in press; den Elzen and van Vuuren, 2007; Meinshausen et al. 
2006).  
What does stand out as important for the purposes of appraisal, however, is the following: when 
it comes to eliminating net CO2 emissions from the production of electricity, there are several 
possible technological pathways available, and for a variety of reasons it is not entirely clear at 
this point which pathway policy makers will take (Deetman et al. 2011). This matters for 
appraisals because the alternative energy transition pathways have profoundly different 
implications for the overall architecture of the European energy system. It would be good if it 
were possible to appraise whether a proposed action is consistent with Europe’s future energy 
system architecture, but given that that architecture has yet to be determined, this is simply not 
yet possible. 
Three sets of technologies are available to provide decarbonized power over the coming decades: 
nuclear fission, CCS, and renewables. Each has their strengths and weaknesses, the details of 
which go beyond the scope of this report. What is important here is that both scaling up nuclear 
power, and implementing CCS, would require very little in the way of changes to planning and 
operating the power system by EU and national level decision makers (Lilliestam, Bielicki, and Patt 
2012). By contrast, the scaling up of renewables would require some fundamental changes. First, 
it would likely require greater cooperation between EU member states, to the possible extent of 
unifying national power markets into a single European market ( Patt et al. 2011). Second, it 
could require initiating cooperation with non-European producers of renewable electricity, 
including the situation whereby the EU region as a whole would import a substantial share of its 
electricity (MacKay 2009). Third, it would almost certainly require the construction of a 
substantial new power transmission networks that cross national borders, in turn requiring 
enhanced cooperation between EU member states, and potentially third parties, over their 
planning, financing, and operation (Battaglini, Lilliestam, et al. 2009). If the renewables path were 
to dominate, then it would be relevant to appraise consistency with greater cooperation and 
interdependency on issues of energy and infrastructure planning and operation. IA, SEA and EIA 
currently do not consider these much broader strategic questions. Consistent with the findings in 
the RESPONSES project, the recently completed EU roadmap for achieving 2050 emissions cuts 
leaves all options open (European Commission 2011). 
3.3 What about energy efficiency? 
Energy efficiency and reductions in energy demand remain important criteria for appraisal for 
three reasons. First, total energy use will influence greenhouse gas emissions as long as the 
energy system as a whole generates net greenhouse gas emissions. Second, total energy use will 
influence the sustainability of biofuel use. There is a direct effect in the case of energy demand in 
the transportation and heating sectors, where reduction in energy demand will lead to an overall 
decline in the demand for biofuels. There is an indirect effect in the case of demand for 
electricity. Here, some share of power will likely be supplied by solid biomass combustion, and 
this could divert fuel stocks away from liquid biofuels production, reducing the supply that could 
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be considered sustainable. Third, and potentially most important, is that the single most 
important factor constraining the pace at which CO2 emissions can be eliminated from the 
production of electricity is the rate at which market actors can plan, gain permits for, finance, 
and ultimately construct new infrastructure (Schellekens et al. 2011). This could include 
renewable power plants and transmission lines, nuclear power stations, or CO2 transport and 
storage facilities. The lower the overall energy demand, the slower the pace at which new 
infrastructure will be needed, and the more rapidly can infrastructure associated with fossil fuels 
be phased out. 
In the context of appraising effects on energy efficiency, however, it is important to take into 
account the so-called “rebound effect,” a feature of energy demand often ignored in current 
appraisals. Owing to the rebound effect, increasing energy efficiency may result in lower energy 
savings than ex-ante analyses, which typically involve some engineering-economic assessment, 
suggest. The literature (e.g. van den Bergh 2008, Berkhout, Muskens & Velthuijsen 2000, 
Greening et al., 2000, Herring & Sorrell, 2009, Madlener and Alcott 2009, Sorrell 2007) typically 
distinguishes between direct, indirect and macro-economic/economy-wide rebound effects: 
 With the direct rebound effect, demand increases because improved energy efficiency 
lowers the price of using energy services. For example, purchasing a fuel-efficient car may 
induce people to drive greater distances, or faster.  
 With the indirect rebound effect, one considers that energy efficiency also results in lower 
energy costs, which outweigh higher investment costs (for a more energy-efficient bulb or 
car), disposable income increases. People spend this money on other things, for which 
there is associated energy use. 
 The macro-economic rebound effect results when radical innovations, resulting in 
additional applications of energy-using technologies, result in additional economic 
growth at the societal level. Notably, the development of more efficient steam engines 
spurred industrialization, causing a huge increase in energy demand (first observed by 
Jevons, 1865).  
While the literature generally agrees that rebound effects exist, their size, relevance and 
explanations are controversial (Sorrell, 2007). Most empirical analyses of rebound effects refer to 
the household sector, in particular to transportation (in the US) or to space heating and lighting. 
Only a few studies explore rebound effects in industry (e.g. Saunders 2013). According to the 
literature synthesis by Maxwell et al (2011), the rebound effect for applications in the household 
sector tends to range between 10% and 30% (notable exceptions include Frondel et al. 2008, 
2012). That is, 10% to 30% of the technical energy savings are eaten up by the various types of 
rebound effects. The (combination of the various) rebound effects may even result in ‘backfire’, 
i.e. over-compensate the energy efficiency effects and result in an increase in energy use. Unless 
power supply is carbon-free, or other countervailing measures are implemented, the rebound 
effect, which is typically defined for energy use, translates into lower than expected greenhouse 
gas emission savings.   
Since empirical estimates are context-specific, generalising findings from one region or period in 
time is not appropriate. For example, the degree of energy service saturation (which is expected 
to depend on income levels) varies widely across countries and time.  
In principle, rebound effects should be considered in policy impact assessments. For example, in 
its most recent World Energy Outlook, the IEA (2012) assumes an overall rebound effect of 9%. 
Similarly, the US Department of Transportation assumes a rebound of 10% in the Regulatory 
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Impact Statement to assess the effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards 
for passenger cars and light trucks. Our analysis of appraisals in the EU does not reveal a 
consistent approach to dealing with the rebound effect. 
3.4 Key insights from the RESPONSES project 
Insight 1: In appraising consistency of a proposed intervention with EU climate mitigation 
goals, the effects on total energy demand are one consideration, but decoupling energy use 
from greenhouse gas emissions is more important. 
The EU goals for mitigation see a building down of CO2 emissions over time. For 2020, the goal 
is to reduce emissions from 1990 levels by 20%, for 2050 it is 80%, and shortly after 2050 it will 
need to be 100%. Improvements in efficiency can and will play a direct role in helping Europe to 
achieve its 2020 targets, and these direct effects are largely linear. For the longer-term targets, 
however, the effects become increasingly indirect, as the overall carbon intensity of the energy 
system declines, and ultimately reaches zero. Owing to these indirect effects, it is not possible to 
translate a reduction in energy use into an amount of emissions avoided, and compare 
competing proposals in this manner. This is because there is not likely to be a linear relationship 
between declining energy use and the feasibility of complete decoupling. 
In calculating the effects on energy demand, moreover, it is important to pay attention to the 
rebound effect, both direct and indirect. The rebound effect means that improvements in energy 
efficiency, when driven by cost-saving measures such as improvements in technology or 
processes, will shift consumption patterns in such a way as to create additional energy elsewhere, 
reducing the net savings. When reductions in demand are driven by increases in energy prices, 
the rebound effect can be avoided. In the extreme, the rebound effect can lead to backfire, 
whereby total energy use actually increases as a result of improved efficiency. Estimates of the 
size of the rebound effect vary widely, and appear to be context-specific, and so to the effect that 
a quantitative appraisal of total energy use is sought, considerable attention becomes necessary. 
Insight 2: Appraisal should consider the extent to which a proposed action reduces demand 
for liquid or gaseous fuels, or shifts energy demand from fuels to electricity. 
The greatest constraints to the provision of carbon-neutral energy will likely be with respect to 
liquid and gaseous fuels. Such fuels would almost certainly need to be derived from biomass, and 
the global capacity to provide feedstock in a manner that is both sustainable and equitable is 
limited, likely below possible demand. 
There are two main ways of reducing energy demand. The first is to reduce overall energy 
demand in the transportation and heating sectors. If people drive less, either because the price of 
driving rises, or because the need to drive declines (such as through improved spatial planning), 
or some combination of these, then the demand for gasoline and diesel fuel will fall. This will 
lead to reduced emissions immediately, and also make it more likely that future biofuels 
production can satisfy demand in a manner that is sustainable. Improved building insulation can 
provide similar benefits in the area of heating.  
The second is to electrify transportation and heating. For the former, this can involve a greater 
reliance on electrified rail and bus lines, as well as the diffusion of electric cars, trucks, and 
buses, while the electrification of either air travel or shipping would appear to be difficult. For 
example, proposed actions that concentrate development along public transportation lines, or 
which somehow facilitate the use of charging stations, could have a positive effect, while urban 
sprawl would have a negative effect. For heating, it may mean the conversion of heating systems 
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to geothermal systems of heat pumps. This is often difficult to do in old housing stock, but 
relatively easy in the course of new construction. Measures to increase the turnover of the 
housing stock, for example, might be assessed as having a positive effect. 
Insight 3: In the next few years, European policy makers will face important choices about 
which sets of technologies are at the heart of decarbonization. Once they do so, it will be 
possible to more clearly appraise whether other policies or proposals are consistent with 
that technological pathway.  
Decisions not yet made, but likely to be reached over the coming decade, will determine the 
extent to which Europe expands renewable energy, develops nuclear energy, or implements 
carbon capture and storage, and these will have profoundly different implications on the 
structure of the energy system, energy markets, and the need for international cooperation. This 
is most clearly the case if expanding renewable energy comes to be the dominant approach. In 
such a case, there will need to be greater international cooperation in the planning and operation 
of power systems, a major expansion of the existing power transmission grid, and potentially a 
need to smooth power demand throughout the day and the year.  
What may be particularly important is the future availability of hydro-electricity. Currently, hydro 
is the major source of renewable electricity. Because of geographic constraints on the one hand, 
and adverse environmental effects on the other, it is unlikely that hydro will see much growth in 
the future. However, the fact that hydro is dispatchable—turned on and off quite quickly, without 
throwing away energy—means that it may play an increasingly important role balancing the 
supply of intermittent renewables, namely wind and solar. One of the main factors that could play 
a role in constraining hydro, or limiting its flexibility, is the necessity to maintain environmental 
flows, namely keeping river flow rates above a certain level in order to sustain aquatic 
ecosystems (Brouwer et al 2013). Factors that affect the hydrology of a watershed, such as 
changes in runoff or in demand for irrigation, can affect the sufficiency of environmental flows. 
As the results from the RESPONSES project suggest, however, it is too early to tell which 
mitigation approach will be dominant. Likewise, the current EU Roadmap to 2050 leaves all 
options open. If Europe is to stay on track towards the 2°C target, analysis reveals, substantial 
changes in investment will need to take place between now and 2020, meaning that the choice of 
pathway is something that policy makers need to confront quite soon, if not immediately. The 
urgency is particularly profound given the tendency for society to lock in to new technologies. As 
they do so, and as the future shape of the European energy system become more certain, then 
precise guidelines on appraising consistency with that architecture will become both possible and 
imperative. 
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4 Exceeding the 2°C target 
Since 1996, the EU’s official commitment has been to hold average global temperature increases 
to a maximum of 2°C, the threshold after which ‘dangerous’ climate change (in the language of 
the UNFCCC) is considered to occur. Given the political importance of this commitment, the 
question arises of whether consideration of the implications of higher temperature changes and 
associated impacts may be discouraged. If so, there could be implications for the robustness of 
EU policy and/or decisions at lower ‘tiers’ of governance, including project level. According to 
Stafford-Smith et al (2009), concerns about ‘mal-adaptation’ could be realized if, on the 
assumption that the 2°C target will be reached, society invests in activities that prove, at best, 
costly and pointless if a 4°C future materializes, and at worst may have prevented more 
transformative measures (see also O’Brien et al. 2012). In this section, we offer a brief literature 
review on important scientific aspects of the issue, highlight some evidence for the issue being 
problematic in current assessments, and suggest guidance to decision-makers on how to deal 
with it. 
4.1 The importance of the issue, and problematic nature of current 
assessment practice 
4.1.1 The growing prospect of exceeding 2°C 
Concern is growing among climate scientists that the continuing growth in emissions, led by 
China, means that the probability of staying within 2°C is diminishing. By 2015, ‘lock-in’ caused 
by continued investment in carbon-intensive infrastructures around the globe could mean the 
door to achieving the target is effectively closed (IEA 2012; PWC 2012). Other influential 
commentators, including a former Chair of the IPCC, have suggested that the door has already 
closed (Ghosh 2012), i.e. the ‘emissions gap’ highlighted by UNEP (2012) cannot be made up.   
Moreover, peer-reviewed analysis suggests not only that 4°C mean temperature rise could 
eventually be the effect of current emission trends, but that this could occur even as early as the 
2060s (Betts et al. 2011). Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate this possibility. There is evidence that 
changes will be more severe and quicker in some spatial areas than others – e.g. boreal, arctic 
(Joshi et al. 2011). 
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Figure 6.  Projections of global warming for the A1FI emissions scenario. This is widely 
considered to be a “business as usual” scenario, and indeed falls the closest to actual 
emissions since 2000. Since there had already been roughly 0.5°C warming by the 
period 1980-2000, the dashed red line indicates 4°C warming above pre-industrial. 
Unless there is an immediate departure from “business as usual,” the 2°C threshold 
will be exceeded with near certainty. Source: Betts et al (2011). 
 
   
Figure 7.  Projections of global warming for the A1FI emissions scenario. Source: Betts et al. 
(2011). 
4.1.2 Scenarios used in EU research and policy making 
Given the diminishing probability of staying within 2°C of warming, we should expect EU policy 
making to be informed by scenarios assuming high emissions, including the fossil-fuel intensive 
scenarios that the world appears to be following (i.e. A1FI). Here, we find some cause for 
concern. 
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For the Commission’s Adaptation White Paper, PESETA project analysis was used, showing how 
Europe could be vulnerable based on selected potential impacts for both B2 and A2 scenarios. 
According to the DG Climate Action’s own commissioned project on Climate Proofing of Policies 
in the Short Term (Altvater et al 2011), the lack of consideration for higher emission scenarios is 
more widespread than this one policy document: 
- ‘Most of the existing scenarios suffer from being ‘too plausible’ and almost systematically 
avoid inclusion of discontinuity (high impact low probability extreme events). This 
compromises the role of scenarios as a tool for exploring a wide range of possible futures 
and hence to help to prepare ‘Plan B’ in order to be able to act more adequately in 
extreme situations’ (Altvater et al 2011: 126). 
The Impact Assessment for the Energy 2050 Roadmap provides a clear example of the 
Commission apparently assuming the 2°C target will be achieved. The document explicitly states 
that ‘[c]onstant climate conditions were assumed over time. This simplification may be justified 
given that all decarbonisation scenarios assume that the climate targets are met’ (European 
Commission 2011: p39). This effectively rules out the possibility that even if the EU were to meet 
its decarbonisation objectives, expressed in the Roadmap, global GHG concentrations could still 
reach a level that leads to the target being exceeded, with correspondingly more severe impacts 
set in train. The potentially serious consequences arising from higher impacts for the EU’s ability 
to achieve its stated objectives, i.e. the kind of de-carbonisation envisaged (if hydropower was 
more constrained by more severe water shortages, biomass imports became less available, etc), 
remain unexamined.  
In a vulnerability assessment on behalf of DG Energy, Rademaekers et al (2011) suggest that the 
IPCC’s A1B is the worst-case scenario in terms of climate change effects and the most commonly 
used. A1B projects that carbon emissions will continue to grow until 2050, after which they will 
begin to decline and that global surface temperatures will increase by 3.4ºC by the end of the 
century. This scenario is used as the point of departure because it is viewed as the ‘most likely 
and most troubling realistic GCM scenario in the academic sector and is referred and used in 
comparable studies’ (Rademaekers 2011: p44). Significantly, however, the possibility of a higher 
emission A1FI scenario does not figure. Researchers in Responses Work Package 8 suggest that it 
is in many cases external constraints, namely the amount of funding, which prevents analysis of 
more and very diverse scenarios, rather than a lack of awareness. 
The Responses Work Package on Regional Infrastructure (WP6) stresses the need for multi-model 
data to reduce uncertainty (see Climatic Change paper). They find that the choice of GCM/RCM 
simulation has a huge influence on climate impact assessment results and their spatial patterns. 
For instance, some trends appear to be particularly certain (e.g. increased fire risk in the south), 
while others are quite uncertain (e.g. trends on heat and fire in France) Flood risk seems to be 
particularly difficult to predict in the south (due to increasing climate extremes in particular in 
those regions). 
There is a further issue related to the comparability of scenario building in the EU across the 
range of relevant policy sectors, where concern has been raised in the literature. Altvater et al 
(2011) comment that existing European scenarios have been developed independently, with each 
using different combinations of emission, climate and socio-economic scenarios, assumptions, 
projections for different time horizons and communication of uncertainties.  
-  ‘This makes it difficult and sometimes impossible to compare the results from different 
studies and to form a vision of the possible ranges of future developments, needed for a 
coherent climate adaptation policy. Such a coherent vision requires a standard set of 
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emission, climate and socio-economic scenarios, which can facilitate comparability on 
European-wide scale. Selection of variables, plausible range for these variables and causal 
mechanisms and linkages among different processes for such a set will need the 
deployment of probabilistic methods, with probabilities chosen in consultation with 
relevant stakeholders. In addition, standardised rules for development of sectoral 
assessments, based on the above mentioned standardised set of emission, climate and 
socioeconomic scenarios is also missing, making the results of each comparison of 
climate impacts in different sectors for the need of adaptation subjective and not 
transferable’ (Altvater et al 2011a: 128).  
While flexibility to use different assumptions can be valuable, a deliverable from the FP6 MACIS 
project highlights how many futures and scenario studies have been undertaken by research 
teams without a specific decision-making audience, and have not been sufficiently designed or 
communicated for their use in decisions-making (Wilson and Piper 2008: 67). The European 
Environment Agency’s SWOT analysis of some selected studies (EEA 2008) makes similar points 
about the transparency and consistency of scenarios. 
4.2 RESPONSES research on mainstreaming climate change beyond 2°C 
In principle, it could be argued that the continued high level EU political commitment to 2°C, 
while a 4°C world looms ever closer, is less problematic than might be feared, for two reasons: 
- At national/ local level, adaptation planners are well aware of, and taking into account in 
their day-to-day work, the prospect of much higher levels of warming.  
- In many cases the preparation required for 2°C and 4°C worlds will effectively be the 
same, as the divergences between impacts associated with each will occur after mid-
century, beyond the lifetime of many of today’s planning/ investment decisions.  
However, findings from the MACIS project suggest that the failure to test robustness of policy 
against a range of scenarios filters down to lower tiers. Wilson and Piper (2008: 66) comment 
that ‘it is clear (for instance, from the stakeholder workshops … on the EU Green Paper on 
Adaptation) that for the most part existing policy review tools, such as the EU’s Impact 
Assessment procedure, and EU-wide obligations on Member States such as EIA and SEA, are not 
systematically using these scenarios [IPCC, MEA and UNEP] to assess the robustness or resilience 
of plans or projects to climate change under different socio-economic conditions’. 
Regarding (b), Responses Work Package 4 covering the water sector suggests that River Basin 
Management Planning may be one case where the divergence between impacts between 2°C and 
4°C does indeed take place beyond the lifetime of current decision-making. In the first planning 
cycle of the Water Framework Directive, planning documents (see e.g. the Oder and Vistula RBMP) 
suggest that the foreseen climate changes will be of very little importance for the actions 
envisaged. In Poland, 2°C temperature increase is probable only in the second half of the 21st 
century. It is expected that within the time frame of WFD implementation (til 2027) a climate 
change signal will thus not be statistically distinguishable from the effects of other human 
pressures. Most investments undertaken in the electricity sector now do not last into the second 
half of this century. For instance, conventional power plants rarely have a lifetime of more than 
40 years, while renewable power generation installations such as wind turbines tend to last about 
20 years. Therefore, current investments in such installations are generally not affected by 
whether a 2°C or 4°C world emerges in the second half of the 21st century.  
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But there are cases where investments have a longer lifetime, and where a precautionary 
approach (in line with the EU’s founding Treaties) would suggest assuming the greater level of 
warming. A substantial proportion of infrastructure built in the next five years will still be in use 
long after 2030 (DEFRA 2011). Even if infrastructure is built with a 40 year design life, it can 
remain after that (and equally if not more importantly, so can the changes in land-use that it may 
have facilitated). Parts of London’s sewage system are 300 years old, but were not built with that 
timescale in mind (DEFRA 2011). In the electricity sector, although individual installations may 
have a relatively short lifetime, the system as a whole, whose structure is - at least in parts - 
being determined now for future years, possibly also beyond 2060, might be affected by the 
implications of a 4°C as opposed to a 2°C world. More specifically, the way the power system is 
organized, i.e. how much power is transmitted and how interconnected the system is might 
influence its vulnerability. More extreme weather events might require more resilient grid 
infrastructure (Government Office for Science 2012). Furthermore, one could argue that R&D 
undertaken now to develop power plants and power system components that will be built after 
2050 should factor in challenges a 4°C world presents, including possible extreme events. 
Particular dilemmas arise in the case of planning for biodiversity, where decisions need to be 
taken regarding the spatial prioritization of protected sites in the face of future uncertainties 
(Kujala 2012; Kujala et al, in press). In the Responses project, the biodiversity work package has 
shown that climate impacts are much larger in a 4°C scenario, even when accounting for some 
negative effects of mitigation actions on biodiversity. Uncertainty in projections for biodiversity is 
substantial (Garcia et al 2012), and derives mostly from the bioclimatic envelop models, and less 
so from the climatic models. Biodiversity research encourages the use of model ensembles to 
account for some of this uncertainty (Garcia et al 2012; Araujo et al, in press). Commenting on 
post-fire management in alpine forests, Steffen et al. (2009) argue that the trees that will provide 
nesting hollows and microclimates for many other species in 120 years’ time need to be 
established now; yet in 120 years different tree species are likely to be successful under different 
futures. In this case, Steffen et al suggest that the only option is to hedge risk by promoting the 
establishment of different species in different parts of the same landscape, in the certain 
knowledge that some of them will turn out to be the wrong choices. The fact that some 
adaptation decisions may be so awkward needs recognizing, particularly as the likelihood of a 
4°C world increases (Stafford-Smith et al 2009). We note that the issue is only briefly touched on 
in the Commission’s new Guidance document on managing the effects of climate change on the 
Natura 2000 network (EC 2012), in a discussion about reviewing the need for new protected 
areas.3  
Regarding point (a) above, according to Stafford-Smith et al. (2009), planners/ practitioners are 
not sufficiently aware of such uncertainties surrounding decision making. Work Package 4 offers 
some evidence that this may indeed be the case, for example in Poland.4 In the energy sector, 
even in the UK, where adaptation policy making is relatively advanced, a member of the 
Treasury’s advisory committee Infrastructure UK has suggested that assumptions currently 
informing UK infrastructure planning for energy are at odds with the Environment Department’s 
                                                            
3 This discussion quotes work by Esteve-Selma et al (2010). 
4 Climate change was not included in the CBA for the Wielowieś Klasztorna reservoir (although its lifetime is 
certainly more than 40 years). But note that including it may have strengthened the case for the reservoir. The 
most recent policy document concerning climate change (due by end of 2012) is the Strategy for climate 
change adaptation for Poland. In preparation of the Strategy analyses were conducted based on ENSEMBLES 
scenarios, mostly A1B. The highest increase for the average temp. in Poland was estimated at the level of 3 
degrees. 
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warnings that the planet is on course for 4 degrees of warming (Nick Mabey, E3G, pers.com). The 
Infrastructure UK committee has warned that practice will need to improve from the position in 
the past where ‘[g]overnment has not produced a coherent view of the long term needs for UK 
infrastructure. Too often, there has been an emphasis on individual projects rather than taking 
into account the wider picture and the dependencies between sectors. The importance of 
maintenance, resilience and renewal of existing assets has often been neglected’ (HM Treasury 
and Infrastructure UK 2010). The fact that planning of infrastructure development is fragmented 
and relatively short-term compared to the lifespan of its assets discourages consideration of 
climatic change impacts expected to occur during that lifespan. Instead climatic changes are 
adjusted-to incrementally through a reactive rather than proactive, systemic approach 
(Government Office for Science 2012). 
Further survey work would be needed to establish to what extent adaptation planning ‘on the 
ground’ does take into account worst-case scenarios. Significantly, however, such research may 
not be conclusive either way; a recent review by the UK’s Adaptation Sub-Committee of reporting 
by water companies of their responses to climate risks stated that:  
-  ‘it is clear that water companies are actively considering current and future climate risks 
across the range of their operations. However, the reports did not provide sufficiently 
detailed information for us to assess whether water companies are systematically 
accounting for long-term climate risks in their investment planning in relation to 
managing the supply demand balance’ (ASC 2011: 60). 
- ‘In our assessment, the current guidance on investment planning does not fully account 
for the uncertainty associated with climate change. Neither do water companies present a 
robust assessment of the implications of climate uncertainty in their plans for future 
investment that use this guidance. Planning focuses on a medium climate change 
scenario, along with an additional supply buffer. While companies are asked to sensitivity 
test their investment plans to different future scenarios, it is not clear that this is 
comprehensively factored into decision-making. This means it is hard to know how well 
water supplies would cope if futures outside the medium scenario were to be realised’ 
(ASC 2011: 60, emphasis added). 
Difficult decisions about adaptation are being made now, and harder choices are going to have to 
be made in the future. Yet for the time being, even in the most widely publicized examples of 
adaptation decision-making, such as the Thames Estuary 2100 study, it has been observed that 
the evidence needed to explore climate risks and the costs of adaptation from several 
perspectives is not transparently available (Hall et al 2012). The decision-makers’ toolkit needs a 
greater diversity of instruments, and skills in deploying them need to be improved. 
4.3 Key insights from the RESPONSES project 
Insight 1:  Even in relatively progressive jurisdictions, there is evidence that adaptation 
planners in key sectors insufficiently take into account the prospect of more extreme levels 
of warming than 2°C in their day-to-day work. 
As adaptation planning has started in earnest in the EU, researchers in a number of projects—
RESPONSES, but also MEDIATION and others—have begun to assess the state of the art for such 
planning. They have found that adaptation planners often have very little guidance on the 
practice of adaptation appraisal. In particular, there is a great deal of confusion concerning the 
level of climate change and associated impacts to expect in the coming decades. 
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This lack of awareness is of direct consequence for planning specifically geared towards 
adaptation. It also may have an indirect consequence for the mainstreaming of climate concerns 
into other planning efforts. People look to adaptation plans for indications of the seriousness of 
the threat. When those plans understate the severity of possible future climate changes, this may 
be reflected in decision makers’ assumptions throughout a wide range of policy sectors, and 
undermine the process of mainstreaming. 
Insight 2: There is reason for concern about the validity of current and past policy 
appraisals, because of a widespread failure to consider the robustness of proposed actions 
to conditions associated with warming far greater than 2°C.  
The 2°C threshold does not come out of thin air: it represents the best estimate of the overall 
level of climate change at which impacts will start to be felt broadly, many of them beyond the 
ability of ecosystems and human societies to adapt. Below 2°C, it may be possible to assume that 
the world will look more or less the same as it does today. Above 2°C, and there may be 
important discontinuities. Important ecosystem services may fail, communities may need to 
migrate. It is impossible to predict most of these changes with certainty, but at the same time 
one can imagine many of them occurring with some substantial probability, should total warming 
go significantly beyond 2°C.  
Organizations like the World Bank have started the process of screening their investment 
portfolio to see what projects—both those already existing and those in the planning stages—
might be vulnerable to such changes. In the context of appraisal within the EU, however, such 
considerations have been largely absent. This may be because the EU has adopted the formal 
target of 2°C for mitigation, which then creates the justification for overlooking impacts 
associated with higher levels of global warming. Regardless of the cause, however, there is 
reason to be concerned that proposals have been put into place, and are continuing to be put 
into place, without consideration of whether they create conditions that will increase vulnerability 
to extensive climate change impacts. 
Insight 3: The results of independently conducted assessments of climate impacts in 
different sectors are often not transparent, comparable or transferable. 
One of the governance challenges of the 21st century is to take advantage of interactions across 
different policy sectors, integrating different policies so that they may serve society’s core 
objectives in a manner that is synergistic, rather than conflictual. For this to happen, however, it 
is essential to be able to compare the effects of policies across such sectors. One place to look 
for the basis of that comparison is the results of formal appraisal, such as IA or SEA. 
In the case of climate change, such comparison is exceedingly difficult. As RESPONSES work has 
highlighted, there is a lack of uniformity concerning how appraisals deal with possible future 
climate impacts. Some may stop at 2°C, while others concern themselves with impacts far greater. 
Because it is not always transparent when this is happening, it may be very difficult to draw 
conclusions concerning differential impacts of sectoral activities as a result of climate change. 
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5 Adaptation goals 
In adaptation policy there is increasing demand for information about policy effectiveness. The 
development of adaptation indicators has been proposed by the European Environment Agency, 
and the European Commission in its Adaptation Strategy (to be published March 2013) is 
expected to propose mechanisms for reporting and evaluating adaptation in various policies at 
the EU level and at national level in EU Member States. 
In order to say something about the effectiveness of policies, we need to start with their social, 
economic or political objectives. The main goal of adaptation will normally be to ensure that 
existing policy objectives can be secured, even under conditions of climate change. Therefore, in 
most cases, the goal of policies that promote adaptation will be to achieve current policy 
objectives, whether these relate to specific welfare, risk management or development goals. In 
this ‘conservative’ view, adaptation represents changes in policy, programmes and projects that 
allow current policy goals to be secured under conditions of climate change. Intermediate goals 
to achieve this successful policy may exist at various levels, such as making information 
available, provision of financial instruments, and development of legislation.  
More recently, a debate has emerged about ‘transformative’ adaptation (Kates et al., 2012). In 
this case, prevailing policy goals or other social objectives may themselves be changed, 
voluntarily or involuntarily, opening up a different set of adaptation options. So, for instance, 
from a ‘conservative’ perspective, a rising coastal flood risk may lead to new investments in flood 
defence in order to maintain flood risk at current levels, while from a ‘transformative’ perspective 
a decision may be made to abandon a coastal area and plan for managed retreat instead. Under 
the conservative perspective, the goal of adaptation is to make new investments to maintain the 
status quo; under the transformative perspective an adjustment is made in the goal of 
adaptation, implying also a quite different strategy of adaptive actions. 
We have earlier stated that adaptation or climate policy should be evaluated on a minimum set of 
criteria and that these should be included in appraisal approaches. These criteria are: 
- Goal attainment (i.e. emissions reduction and vulnerability reduction) 
- Cost-benefit 
- Political feasibility 
5.1 Defining adaptation goals for sectors: a risk management approach 
In a risk management framework, risk is defined by the probability and the consequences of a 
threat. Strategies may be adopted to either modify the threat (here defined as proactive), or 
ameliorate consequences (reactive), or more broadly to improve adaptive capacity, without 
specifying particular measures. Adaptation policy can therefore anticipate specific threats or 
consequences, and a policymaker could decide to take action in order to secure existing policy 
objectives. A response to increasing risk is necessary, when consequences of the risk become 
unacceptably high (see Renn, 2008). There may also be cases in which a risk to a valued objective 
becomes intolerably high, because practicable or affordable adaptation options do not exist. In 
this case, it may be possible to speak of a ‘limit’ to adaptation, and preferences with respect to 
valued attributes will need to be adjusted. Under such transformative adaptation, new adaptation 
strategies and options come into consideration. 
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Adaptation goals addressing these risks cover a wide range of options, depending on the sector. 
Some examples are provided in Table 2. In principle, each of these adaptation goals can be linked 
to specific adaptation strategies which in turn can be supported by specific EU policies and 
measures. This is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the relationships between climate change 
impacts on public health, the adaptation strategies available to manage these public health risks 
and the EU policy instruments that could contribute to facilitating these strategies. We therefore 
envisage a causal chain which links ultimate policy objectives through adaptation goals to 
adaptation strategies and on to EU policies and measures that support these strategies (see 
Figure 9). This also makes clear that policy support for adaptation will for the most part be 
integrated into existing policies and measures, rather than being a specific set of measures. 
Table 2  EU policy objectives and adaptation goals. 
Sector Policy objective Adaptation goals 
Health Low heat wave casualties 
toll 
- Maintain cool urban spaces (proactive) 
- Install air conditioning in public buildings (reactive) 
- Adequate heat wave response measures (reactive) 
Biodiversity Maintain viable 
populations of species in 
designated conservation 
areas 
- ensure ecosystem heterogeneity (proactive) 
- increase habitat connectivity (proactive) 
- manage impacts of extreme events (reactive) 
Water Protection of people and 
assets from floods 
- Improving flood defences (proactive) 
- Improving upstream water storage (proactive) 
- Secure buildings from flood water (reactive) 
- Provide detailed information to public on risks 
(reactive) 
Regional 
Policy 
Robust infrastructures 
for economic 
development 
- Reduce vulnerability of infrastructure projects to flood 
risk (proactive) 
 
Energy Develop new energy 
networks for low-carbon 
development 
- Develop energy networks with low vulnerability to 
extreme climate events (proactive) 
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Figure 8 Relationships between climate impacts on public health, adaptation strategies and EU 
policy instruments. 
 
 
Figure 9  The causal chain between policy objectives, adaptation goals, adaptation strategies 
and enabling policies. 
Note:  
Enabling policies may include policies whose objectives are being secured by adaptation goals 
and strategies. Under conditions of transformative adaptation one of the adaptation options will 
be to adjust policy objectives. This is indicated by the pink arrow. 
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5.2 Uncertainty in climate change impacts and in policy effectiveness 
A number of sources of uncertainty are at play, each with implications for defining adaptation 
goals. First, the hazard may be uncertain, as for many weather parameters (the hazard) the future 
rate and extent of change is uncertain or even unknown. This is because climate projections 
show wide spreads and because natural climate variability plays a dominant role in changes of 
extreme events distributions over time. More importantly, the relation between weather, or 
weather extremes and the impacts (consequences) is not always robustly established. Finally, 
other factors besides climate change determine changes in impacts or consequences. 
Socioeconomic development determines the exposure to weather hazards and therefore the 
extent of impacts, depending on a growing population of elderly people (in the case of heat wave 
risk), or the number of assets at risk in flood plain areas (in the case of flood risks). Also, the 
capacity to respond and adapt may increase, through wealth and technological innovation. 
Given these uncertainties, it is hard to estimate the exact impact and timing of anthropogenically-
forced climate change on existing policy objectives. Establishing whether a conservative 
adaptation strategy is appropriate or a transformative strategy is called for will therefore be 
difficult at the EU-level. Where a choice is made to adjust or relinquish prevailing goals, the 
problem of uncertainty will tend to grow. This is primarily because the social and technical 
system being considered is larger and the impacts being considered wider. Assessing the costs, 
benefits and feasibility of dyke-raising is less complex than assessing the costs, benefits and 
feasibility of a programme of managed retreat. Owing to this large, intrinsic and perhaps growing 
uncertainty, there would typically be a preference for allowing greater discretion at lower levels of 
governance. 
When considering adaptation goals, the costs and benefits associated with the implementation of 
adaptation strategies need to be considered. While these strategies may reduce the burden of 
already existing and future weather and climate related impacts and losses, they are only justified 
when they are effective and efficient, that is, when the benefits outweigh the costs. A variety of 
well-established methods: cost benefit analysis, cost effectiveness analysis and multi-criteria 
analysis, are in principle available to assess costs and benefits (UNFCCC, 2011). 
Adaptation goals may prove to be ineffective at securing a policy objective because existing or 
available methods are inadequate. For example, in European biodiversity policy, the Natura 2000 
nature protection areas are designed to preserve target habitat types and species. With ongoing 
anthropogenic climate change, the habitat types and the distribution of species in  these Natura 
2000 areas will come under pressure. For instance, although national protected areas located in 
mountainous areas would preserve species better than unprotected areas, Natura 2000 areas in 
low-lying regions are less well-suited to species protection (Araújo et al., 2011). Certain 
designated Natura 2000 areas could therefore become ineffective over time, in the sense that the 
list of species an area is designed to protect can no longer be secured in that location. 
Here the notion of effectiveness itself may need to be reframed. Narrowly-defined, a particular 
Natura 2000 area may no longer be effective as a ‘stage’ on which to protect a specific ‘actor’. 
But by ensuring greater connectivity between areas it may be possible to protect the species by 
allowing them to move around as their ranges change in response to climate change (Heller and 
Zavaleta, 2009). Under this scheme, effectiveness is judged across the whole network of nature 
protection areas, not simply one. An even more radical reframing would let go of the idea of 
conserving species one-by-one and look instead at species diversity as a whole by focusing on 
overall ‘species richness’ instead (Anderson and Ferree, 2010). Such an approach would 
represent a major change for EU biodiversity policy. 
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Given that adaptation will involve shifts in activities and resources, including the trade-off of 
policy objectives, the question of political feasibility will always play a role. The choice for a 
conservative or more transformative perspective to adaptation will also have a marked impact on 
the question of political feasibility. Under a conservative strategy broadly prevailing political and 
economic interests are preserved and there will be few winners and losers. Under a 
transformative strategy there are likely to be a far broader range of political and economic 
interests affected, some positively and others negatively. The distribution of risks among actors 
is also likely to be changed. Distributional issues arising from adaptation are therefore likely to 
come to the fore. 
5.3 Key insights from the RESPONSES project 
Insight 1: Adaptation goals may be conservative or transformative 
The primary goal of adaptation strategies, enabled by EU sectoral policies, will be to secure 
existing policy objectives under conditions of climate change. This conservative notion of an 
adaptation goal will often involve minor adjustments in the design and implementation of 
policies. However, in some cases the costs of adaptation may not be justified by the benefits in 
terms of public welfare or risk management, or there may be trade-offs with other policy 
objectives that are deemed unacceptable. In extreme cases, practicable adaptation options may 
not be available, signifying an adaptation limit. Under all these conditions, when existing policy 
objectives can no longer be secured, a transformation of policy objectives and adaptation goals 
may be called for. Over the short term, examples of a need to consider transformative adaptation 
are in EU policy sectors such as biodiversity, agriculture and water. 
The implications for policymakers are that they:  
 Should define robust strategies and measures that help attain conditions under which 
policy objectives are likely to remain stable/improve under a wide range of climatic and 
socioeconomic conditions; 
 Where appropriate, consider whether the economic, social, environmental or political 
costs of adapting to secure existing policy objectives may be disproportionate, and 
identify transformative options by reframing policy objectives and goals. 
This is relevant for the purposes of policy appraisal, because explicit adaptation goals typically 
form the basis for the implicit assumptions within appraisals themselves. If, for example, a goal 
of adaptation planning is to maintain ecosystem services in a current location at their existing 
levels, then IA or SEA practitioners will assume this level of ecosystem services in the course of 
conducting cost benefit analysis. If, on the other hand, goals change, such that some ecosystem 
services will be enhanced as a result of climate change or climate policy (e.g. carbon storage, or 
water retention), and others degraded (e.g. irrigation supply), then policy appraisers need to be 
aware of these differences.  
Insight 2: Given high uncertainty, adaptation goals and strategies may need to be devolved 
to lower levels of governance  
The projected impacts of anthropogenic climate change on EU policy objectives in the areas of 
health, biodiversity, regional development and infrastructure, water, and energy, are highly 
uncertain. There are temporal and regional uncertainties about the projected changes in climate 
and weather parameters, as well as uncertainties in social systems that determine economic 
development and thus possible impacts, adaptive responses and residual impacts. Uncertainties 
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may also arise through the transformation of policy objectives themselves, as the envelope of 
potential outcomes, effects and adaptation costs widens. Owing to this complexity and 
uncertainty, the potential for sound top-down governance of adaptation appears to be limited. 
The implications for policymakers are that: 
 In climate-vulnerable policy sectors, there will tend to be a stronger rationale for 
discretion and decision-making power at lower levels of governance as a result of climate 
and socio-economic uncertainties 
 Even under conditions of high uncertainty, EU adaptive capacity and resilience may be 
enhanced through cross-European networks and interchange. Examples include the 
Natura2000 network and cross-border river basin agreements related to flooding and 
drought. EU sectoral policies should be reviewed to exploit these opportunities. 
For the purposes of appraisal, this implies that there needs to be greater communication across 
levels of government, such that the revisions in adaptation goals that may be made at lower 
levels are apparent to those appraising policy proposals at higher levels. 
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6 Appraising uncertainty 
A constant theme in the assessment of climate change and policy responses is the issue of 
uncertainty, and its twin brother, that of learning (ONeill et al. 2006). Countless articles have 
highlighted the role of uncertainty in climate policy making (e.g. Barnett 2001; Felgenhauer and 
De Bruin 2009; Tol 2003), suggesting aspects of climate uncertainty that need to be 
communicated (e.g. Risbey 2007; Webster et al. 2003) and how best to communicate them (e.g. 
Patt and Dessai 2005; Kloprogge et al. 2007; Webster 2003). Conventional wisdom in the climate 
change research and policy community holds that any perception by the public that there is 
uncertainty in the science behind climate change and its attribution to human actions has been 
and will continue to be the death knell for effective policy-making to combat it. At the same time, 
the climate change research and policy community has long recognized the importance of getting 
uncertainty communication “right,” i.e., describing it accurately, completely, and free of value. 
There have been numerous guidance notes, written for the benefit of scientists, assessment team 
authors, and decision-makers, on how to measure, appraise, and respond to uncertainty; one set 
of examples is the series of guidance notes written by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) (Moss and Schneider 2000; Manning et al. 2004; Mastrandrea et al. 2010). 
One way of dealing with uncertainty is through the approach to governance. Ecologists developed 
the idea of “adaptive management” as a governance paradigm given high systems uncertainty 
(Holling 2001). The core idea of adaptive management is to design policy processes not only to 
take advantage of new information, but also to generate the information that may be useful in 
the future. A core aspect of this is to ensure that there is sufficient variance in the policies 
adopted at any given time; rather than all jurisdictions adopting a pre-supposed set of best 
practices, different jurisdictions should attempt to implement different practices, some of which 
might be better than others. There have been few real attempts to apply this concept at scale; in 
the only systematic analysis of such an attempt, Lee (1993) looked at the attempt to use adaptive 
management to restore salmon stocks in the Columbia River Basin, and found it to be a doomed 
quest, done in by political factors. A scaled back version of adaptive management, and often 
mistaken for it, is simply to ensure that policies can and will be updated over time. Rather than 
adopting a particular policy at one time, and assuming it will exist unchanged for decades into 
the future, it may be possible to ensure that it comes under periodic review. “Sunsetting” clauses, 
for example, can force this, requiring legislative or regulative action to sustain a policy past a 
particular date. It may be possible to evaluate, in the context of a policy approasial or 
assessment, the extent to which a particular option is adaptive over time, and hence could be 
responsive to new and improved information. 
In the context of IA, SEA and EIA, however, the process for governance may already be pre-
defined; there may be little flexibility with respect to whether a policy implemented now may be 
changed in the future. Hence, it is incumbent to incorporate uncertainty into the analysis of 
competing options. In this section, we cull the literature to offer guidance that is relevant for the 
purposes of mainstreaming climate change concerns into environmental, impact, and strategic 
environmental assessment practices. We take as a starting point the assumption that such 
assessments will cover far more than the climate mitigation and adaptation implications of a 
particular policy or project proposal. Given this, the time, attention, and resources available for 
addressing the uncertainties inherent in climate concerns may be limited. With these limits in 
mind, we arrive at three main practical insights. First, there are many uncertainties that are 
important for considering climate mitigation and adaptation implications of actions, and in many 
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cases the most important ones are not those associated with climate science and prediction, but 
rather with the future development of economic, social, and technological systems. Second, most 
of the formalized methods for addressing uncertainty in policy appriasal and development 
require resources that go well beyond the scope of the typical environmental or impact 
assessment. It may be impossible to apply the methods quantitatively, and yet still possible to 
pay attention to some of the key insights. Third, qualitative decision tree mapping of the space of 
alternatives and information may be an excellent first step—and in some cases only step—in 
exploring the relative and absolute importance of key uncertainties within a strategic assessment 
process. 
6.1 Guidelines for assessment, communication, and decision-making 
There have been a number of articles and guidelines written on the subject of uncertainty 
management in the context of climate change and climate policy development. These have 
included sets of advice to scientists, to scientific assessment author teams, and to decision-
makers. In particular the latter of these cover many of the formal methods that are potentially 
well suited to strategic assessment, the subject of this report. We cover the more well-known and 
most recent. 
6.1.1 IPCC guidance notes 
The IPCC’s attention to the issue of uncertainty began with the Third Assessment Report (TAR), 
completed in 2001, with the preparation of a background paper and guidelines for author teams 
(Moss and Schneider 2000). Their intention was to provide a set of steps for the various 
assessment chapter team authors to follow. These were: 
 For each of the major findings developed in the chapter, identify the most important 
factors and uncertainties that are likely to affect the conclusions. 
 Document ranges and distributions in the literature, including sources of information on 
the key causes of uncertainty. 
 Given the nature of the uncertainties and state of science, make an initial determination 
of the appropriate level of precision that is possible, such as qualitative versus 
quantitative. 
 Quantitatively or qualitatively characterize the distribution of values that a parameter, 
variable, or outcome may take. 
 Using two specific sets of terms, rate and describe the state of scientific information on 
which the conclusions and/or estimates depend. One set of terms encompasses 
qualitative judgment on the confidence the authors have in the basic knowledge: 
speculative, established but incomplete, competing explanations, and well established. 
The other set of terms matched particular words (e.g. very unlikely, unlikely, likely, very 
likely) to specific ranges of quantitatively assessed probability estimates. 
 Prepare a “traceable account” of how the estimates were constructed. 
Following inconsistent uptake of the guidelines by the different working groups, the IPCC 
organized an expert meeting to prepare for the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), from which it 
drafted new guidelines. With 79 participants, the workshop featured a large number of 
presentations and breakout groups for each of the working groups to discuss. Following the 
workshop, the organizers drafted a report summarizing the proceedings (Manning et al., 2004), 
an Annex of which included a concept paper on the issue (Manning and Petit, 2004). A shortened 
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version of the concept paper appeared as a guidance note for lead authors (IPCC, 2005). The new 
guidance notes built heavily on the earlier TAR recommendations, and indeed contained little in 
the way of new advice. The AR4 guidance saw more substantial, but still incomplete uptake by 
the author teams. Most recently, the IPCC revisited the issue of uncertainty in preparation for the 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). In July 2010, they organized a small meeting of the WG chairs and 
their close colleagues, which took place in Jasper Ridge, California (IPCC WGII, 2010).  From this 
meeting, a core writing team prepared a new guidance note for lead authors (Mastrandrea et al., 
2010), similar in form to the guidance note prepared for the AR4 lead authors. The primary new 
contribution was to go further in standardizing the language that IPCC authors were to use when 
describing uncertainty. 
6.1.2 United States Government 
The United States Government’s Climate Change Science Program commissioned a set of reports 
to guide assessment, communication, and decision-making across the many agencies dealing 
with climate change. These reports took on the name Synthesis and Assessment Products, or 
SAP’s. SAP 5.2 was one of these, and covered the issue of uncertainty. After initial drafting it went 
through extensive review, comment, and revision, before its final publication in 2009 (Morgan et 
al., 2009).  
The guidance chapter in SAP 5.2 consisted of 16 bullet points, divided under two subheadings, 
Reporting uncertainty and Characterizing and analyzing uncertainty.  Under the latter, the bullet 
points covered the value of undertaking expert elicitations in order to develop quantitative 
uncertainty estimates, the need to be careful in reporting (such as through separate distributions) 
when groups of experts disagree substantially, the need to apply care when using analytic tools 
such as Monte Carlo methods, to pay attention to sources of correlation between uncertain 
parameters, and to provide a traceable account as a form of information pedigree. The points 
continued with the suggestion that it is often effective to present the sensitivity of decisions to 
uncertainties, rather than simply the uncertainties themselves, and on the value of developing 
scenarios that are clear and transparent with respect to the critical variables. The advice 
concluded with the need to examine decisions strategies that are robust to uncertainty or 
ignorance, in cases where meaningful prediction is not possible. 
6.1.3 Dutch Government 
Perhaps the most ambitious set of formal guidance on decision-making under uncertainty was 
prepared by the Dutch government, for use in their administrative agencies, and drew off of the 
work and experience of a group of decision-theorists and empirical social scientists. A series of 
workshops, incorporating feedback from stakeholders, led to a suite of products to be used at 
different stages, and in different contexts, in an environmental assessment. Figure 10 shows the 
products. 
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a.   b.
 
Figure 10  RIVM/MNP Guidance on uncertainty assessment. Part (a) is the suite of products. Part 
(b) shows the matrix for their application. Source: Petersen et al. (2003). 
The starting point for consideration of uncertainty in an environmental assessment is the Mini-
Checklist. This consists of a series of six questions, for each of which the assessment team has 
the option of answering “wholly,” “partly,” or “insufficiently,” and then providing additional 
elaboration if it is thought necessary. These questions are 
1. Problem framing. A series of checkpoints cover whether the assessment authors have 
considered multiple problem framings and the connection with other policy processes.  
2. Involvement of stakeholders. As series of checkpoints asks the assessment authors to 
consider whether they understand the range of stakeholder views.  
3. Selection of indicators. The authors must identify whether the indicators they have chosen 
are unambiguous and well established.  
4. Appraisal of knowledge base. The authors identify the state of the knowledge base upon 
which their conclusions are drawn.  
5. Mapping and assessment of relevant uncertainties. The authors confirm that they 
understand the most important uncertainties relevant for their problem, and have 
identified the key sensitivities of the decision to those uncertainties.  
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6. Reporting of uncertainty information. The authors confirm that they have reported 
uncertainties in a manner that is fair and balanced.  
From its face, the Mini-Checklist accomplishes two things. First, it provides a paper trail showing 
that assessment authors and researchers have paid attention to the issue of uncertainty and 
communication. Second, and more importantly substantively, it raises red flag when there are 
issues of uncertainty, or of communication to stakeholders, that may be problematic. In the case 
of such red flags, it then engages the Quickscan Questionnaire. That document consists of six 
groupings of questions, corresponding to the six items on the mini-checklist. The questions 
require the assessment team to identify, either through short written form (two sentence 
answers) or through checking multiple choice boxes, features of the assessment that have to do 
with its intended users, alternative framings, and associated uncertainties. The Quickscan Hints 
and Actions List is a 24 page document providing guidance to users on how to answer the 
various questions (Janssen et al., 2003). For further guidance, the Detailed Guidance is a 71 page 
document providing the theoretical foundation and background for all of the issues raised in the 
mini-checklist and quickscan questionnaire concerning assessment context and uncertainty 
communication (van der Sluijs et al., 2003). Finally, the Tool Catalogue is a 60-page document 
describing the analytic methods for developing and analyzing uncertainty, including issues such 
as uncertainty propagation, expert elicitation, and scenario analysis (van der Sluijs et al., 2004). 
Wardekker et al. (2008) evaluated the success of the Dutch guidance system of documents. After 
the guidance was in place, they conducted a number of workshops and surveys with a variety of 
stakeholders, gathering data on what information people wanted and found useful, and on their 
specific reaction to an environmental assessment prepared using the guidance documents. Nearly 
across the board, they found that stakeholders did want uncertainties to be described, in 
quantified terms where possible, consistent with the Dutch system. They found substantial 
difficulties with the interpretation of the IPCC uncertainty scale on the one hand, echoing results 
from Patt and Schrag (2003) and Patt and Dessai (2005), and in interpreting the NUSAP kite 
diagram on the other. They did find that stakeholders were interested in information on the 
sources of uncertainty, and that all such detailed information be placed where people would 
actually read it, rather than buried in an appendix. Overall they were positive about the approach 
taken by the Dutch guidance system. 
6.1.4 The European FP7 MEDIATION project 
The most recent effort to provide guidance on decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, 
specifically addressing the issue of climate adaptation, has been the MEDIATION project. The goal 
of the MEDIATION project is to develop a uniform and comprehensive methodology for 
characterizing and acting on information about climate change, in order to assist adaptation 
decision-makers. Two particular deliverables of the project have addressed the tools for dealing 
with uncertainty. 
The first deliverable was a guidance note on uncertainty and adaptation decision-making (A. Patt, 
Hinkel, and Swart 2011). It provided a background on models of human decision-making—
economic, psychological, and sociological—and then covered methods of formal decision-
analysis. For the latter, the document divided methods into those associated with deciding, and 
those associated with valuing outcomes. In the “deciding” methods were multi-criteria analysis, 
cost benefit analysis, cost effectiveness analysis, and robust decision-making. Of these only 
robust decision-making directly responds to the issue of uncertainty. Robust decision-making 
involves the use of computer models to examine the outcomes of a limited number of choice 
options under a wide range of possible future worlds, which in turn differ across several 
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dimensions, including the sensitivity of the climate. The computer models identify those choice 
options that perform well under the widest range of future conditions. In the “valuation” methods 
were expected outcome valuation, expected utility and welfare analysis, general equilibrium 
analysis, inter-temporal discounting, real options analysis, and portfolio analysis. Of these, the 
first two treat uncertainty fairly simply, just taking the mean value of future outcomes, either in 
terms of their monetary valuation or in terms of the associated utility or welfare values. The latter 
two, by contrast, are quite sophisticated. Both real options analysis and portfolio valuation are 
most developed in financial markets, where data availability is high and the dimensions of 
decisions are few. In the area of climate adaptation, the MEDIATION guidance note points out, 
neither of these is typically the case, making both methods very difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to apply. 
The second deliverable is an inventory of methods and metrics that includes a set of policy briefs 
offering a critical review of particular decision-making methods. Three of these cover the 
methods real options analysis, robust decision making, and portfolio analysis, all of which 
specifically address the challenge of decision-making under uncertainty. They offer insights that 
are critical for their applicability for impact, environmental impact, and strategic environmental 
assessment. 
With respect to Real Options Analysis (ROA), the critical insights from the MEDIATION project are 
that (a) its terms of applicability are quite narrow, and (b) the expense of conducting it in a full 
quantitative form is very high. ROA is applicable to one-time, irreversible investments, where 
there are both costs and benefits associated with making the investment now, compared to 
waiting until later to decide whether to make it. Typically the benefit of making an immediate 
investment is that the returns on that investment begin accruing sooner, rather than later. The 
benefits of waiting to make the decision—i.e., leaving the option open—are that more 
information will be known concerning exactly how the investment ought to be made, or whether 
it is even necessary in the first place. The MEDIATION project points to a single example of ROA 
analysis have been used in close to its full quantitative format, and that was for a study of 
adaptation in the Thames Estuary. There, the analysis cost over €1 million; in this case it appears 
worth it, given the magnitude of recommended investments being several billion euros. The 
report suggests that quantitative ROA is likely to be appropriate for adaptation decision-making 
only in exceedingly rare instances. 
Portfolio analysis (PA) is a tool that developed in financial markets in order to maximize the 
expected return from an investment, subject to a fixed level of risk, or conversely minimized the 
risk from an investment, subject to a minimum expected return. The critical insight feeding it is 
the fact that a portfolio of two investments of equal expected return but uncorrelated (or 
negatively correlated) risks gives a combined risk level that is lower than each investment on its 
own. The MEDIATION report points to two examples of PA being used in a climate adaptation 
context; in these cases it was possible to put together a portfolio of adaptation options (in one 
case it involved planting multiple tree species; in the other it involved the combination of several 
flood management procedures), and to evaluate quantitatively their relative performance under a 
range of climate impact scenarios, each of which themselves could be quantified in terms of their 
livelihood. Compared to ROA the analysis was less expensive, but nevertheless involved the 
application of simulation modeling. The report was inconclusive concerning the overall 
usefulness of PA. Furthermore, the MEDIATION report suggested that in practice the application 
of PA is quite similar to that of robust decision making (RDM): the only practical difference 
between them is that PA requires the specification of probabilities for different scenarios, while 
RDM does not (Lempert and Schlesinger 2000; Dessai and Hulme 2007). In return, PA provides a 
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set of portfolios lying at the frontier of the risk/return tradeoff space, while RDM does not 
provide estimates of risk, but rather qualitative insights into the set of future scenarios under 
which each choice option fares well or poorly. The MEDIATION report concluded that RDM offers 
a high potential for application to adaptation decision-support. 
6.2 Key insights from the RESPONSES Project 
Insight 1: Uncertainties in future climate impacts are unevenly distributed, implying a need 
for geographical and temporal specificity in the practice of policy appraisal.  
Over the last decade, there has been a great deal of regional climate modeling for Europe, and 
that has revealed regional variation to be large; this in turn has important implications on 
sensitivities to uncertainty. Kjellström et al. (2011) presented results from regional modeling 
efforts, using 6 different climate models, each run numerous times with a variety of plausible 
input data. Figure 11 shows the results from averaging all model outputs, showing mean values 
for temperature and precipitation changes, summer and winter. Expected temperature changes 
vary seasonally and geographically from 1°C to exceeding 8°C. In the summer, it is primarily 
southern Europe that is expected to see the greatest temperature rise, while in winter it is 
primarily northern Europe. Expected precipitation changes vary seasonally and geographically 
from approximately a 60% decrease to a 60% increase. In both summer and winter, it is generally 
southern Europe that is expected to see a decrease in precipitation, while northern Europe is 
expected see an increase.  What the figure does not show is that across the different models and 
model runs, there is a great deal of variance in the results for each geographical point, summer 
and winter, from which no clear picture emerges.  
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Figure 11  Changes from the period 1961 – 1990 to the period 2071 – 2100, from an ensemble 
of six regional climate models. The dark lines in each figure represent atmospheric 
pressure isobars. Expected temperature changes vary seasonally and geographically 
from 1°C to exceeding 8°C. Expected precipitation changes vary seasonally and 
geographically from approximately a 60% decrease to a 60% increase. Source: 
Kjellström et al. (2011). 
Being able to ignore uncertainty can save a great deal of time and effort, and can make the 
politics of a given decision-task substantially easier. Many adaptation choice options are 
generated to respond to a particular climate parameter changing by at least some threshold value 
by a particular time in the future (such as summer precipitation rising by at least 20% by 2020), 
with a default option of staying with existing practices being appropriate if the threshold is not 
crossed by the relevant time. For regions expecting to see little change in a particular parameter, 
adaptations that address that parameter probably don’t make sense now, while for those regions 
expecting to see a great deal of change, adaptations probably do make sense now. In between 
are those regions expecting to see moderate changes, and it is in those places that decisions are 
sensitive to particular uncertainties. 
It is essential for policy makers to consider locally and seasonally specific climate impacts 
projections. While the need for adaptation may be greatest in those regions expected to see the 
greatest changes, the relevance of uncertainty—and the need to analyze it carefully—may be 
highest in those areas expecting more moderate change in the future. 
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Insight 2: Formalized tools for uncertainty analysis often require too much data to be 
practical 
Coming out of research on governance and politics, there is evidence that the modern 
bureaucratic state derives a great deal of its legitimacy from the application of scientific methods 
to solving public problems (Ezrahi 1990). Consistent with this, there is often pressure to apply 
formalized, quantitative decision-analytic tools in order to backup difficult choices; at the very 
least, these tools can back up hard choices made at taxpayers’ expense. In the burgeoning 
science and policy literature on decision-making under uncertainty, there have been multiple calls 
to base decisions on cost benefit analysis (A. Patt 1999), using complex mathematical methods 
and models to evaluate the expected values for different outcomes. Real options analysis and 
portfolio analysis are two of these tools. 
Observation of practice, however, suggests that the more complicated the tool, the less value it 
may be in real-world situations.  The one example of real options analysis being used to evaluate 
a climate adaptation decision, for example, required over €1 million for the collection and 
analysis of data; even then, the analysis did not manage to quantify all the elements of the 
problem that theory suggests ought to have been. That level of resources is one that is 
unavailable to decision-makers in most cases where an impact assessment, environmental impact 
assessment, and strategic environmental assessment is called for.  
Deciding not to apply the more complicated decision-analytic methods may have the appearance 
of not taking the assessment task seriously. However, the opposite is the case. Taking the task 
seriously means allocating resources to those aspects of the assessment that can provide an 
answer that offer true insights. There have been many studies of how analysts can appraise 
situations involving significant risks and uncertainties that will produce information that is on the 
one hand normatively correct—identifying a strategy that will allow people to achieve their 
goals—and on the other hand enjoys the support of the people who must carry such a strategy 
out. A consistent finding is that analysts tend to miss important factors in such situations, such 
as the key values that stakeholders are trying to advance, the most important risks to those 
values, and even the data that can help to shed light on those risks (Irwin and Wynne 1996). 
Resolving this problem requires involving stakeholders, as partners, in the process of analysis 
(Fischhoff 1995). To make that analysis productive, however, it is important to focus attention on 
the issue of uncertainty. 
One tool that can help to do so is the qualitative mapping of decisions and available information 
over time. This indeed was a strategy at the heart of the Thames Estuary study reported on in the 
MEDIATION project, as well as a wide variety of other context (e.g. Suarez and Patt 2004; Suarez 
et al. in press). The method involves diagramming, such as with decision trees, the decisions that 
need to be made, and some of the outcomes that will occur under different possible states of the 
world. In this context, stakeholders can offer their own opinions about which states of the world 
are more or less likely, and together with analysts they can explore whether it matters which 
state of the world will come to pass, and if it does matter, whether they can learn more about the 
states of the world before committing to an action. In essence, this method of analysis carries 
with it the key insights from real options analysis, but does so at a qualitative level.  
Using assessment and appraisal as a vehicle for conducting such qualitative analysis of 
uncertainty can be very helpful, and indeed it falls within the scope of allowable practice. Of all 
the practical guidance for how to implement this, we see the Dutch strategy, described above, as 
the most transparent and the best developed. It starts at a very qualitative level in order to 
identify those uncertainties that appear important and potentially problematic. With those 
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uncertainties, it identifies a sequence of analytic steps that can be undertaken to examine them. 
These start at a qualitative level, and only move on into the quantitative if such analysis is 
necessary. 
Insight 3: Uncertainties in social systems, rather than the climate, may dominate the type of 
adaptation that is needed and possible; appraisals need to keep an open mind concerning 
what adaptation actions take place ‘down the road’. 
Uncertainties in future climate and climate impacts are large, but uncertainties in both socio-
economic conditions and public attitudes concerning difficult tradeoffs are often even larger. 
Many—indeed most—of the uncertainties in social systems are ones for which it is impossible to 
assign precise probabilities for particular outcomes. In planning whether or not to construct a 
new ski lift, for example, it may be possible to quantify the uncertainty with respect to both 
natural snowfall and the potential for snowmaking (as a result of temperature) at that particular 
place, fifty years in the future. It would be exceedingly difficult, by contrast, to predict which of 
the two types of snow skiers of the future will prefer, which in turn will influence whether the lift 
in the place will be in demand. Combined, uncertainties in natural and social systems can 
preclude meaningful quantitative appraisal of long-term adaptation costs and benefits, and 
efforts to do so may be more misleading than reliable.  
In almost every sector and region of Europe, however, there are major existing maladapatations 
that can be corrected, and it is not unreasonable to focus on these. Indeed, empirical observation 
of adaptation practices, in the RESPONSES project and elsewhere, has shown that adaptation 
primarily addresses existing maladaptations, rather than anticipated problems in the future. This 
is a sensible response to the uncertainties associated with projecting the future. 
For the purposes of appraisal, this matters insofar as analysts assume particular adaptation goals 
and strategies. A cost benefit analysis may assume that people will prepare for an uncertain 
future climate across wide sections of society. But this assumption may be false, and indeed 
there is every reason to suspect that it will not be the case. What may be a more realistic 
assumption is that people will work harder and harder to correct the existing areas where climate 
is a threat. 
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7 Vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
7.1 The basis of the problem 
Starting about fifteen years ago, there began to be a sea change in thinking about climate change 
damages (Füssel and Klein 2006). Until that point, scientific research and assessment had 
primarily focused on the physical and ecological impacts of climate change as the key drivers of 
the damages that people would experience. As Patt et al. (2008) argue, this reflected a policy 
environment in which people viewed the critical question to appraise as the seriousness of 
climate change, and whether it would be worth investing society’s resources to try to stop it. With 
the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC, however, a new framing emerged for thinking 
about damages, namely that of vulnerability. The TAR defined the concept thus: “Vulnerability is 
the degree to which a system is susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of 
climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the 
character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and variation to which a system is exposed, its 
sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity” (McCarthy et al. 2001). The new framing may have grown 
out of recognition that a certain amount of climate change, causing damages, was inevitable; in 
such a case, one relevant policy question remained how much to invest to reduce climate change 
in the future, i.e. mitigation, but another was now how to reduce the damages from those 
changes that could not be prevented. (Patt et al. 2008). 
The concept of vulnerability is closely linked with that of adaptation, and yet in a particular way. 
Adaptation can often take the form of measures that reduce either the exposure or the sensitivity 
of a system to climate change. Measures that reduce exposure include building dikes or sea 
walls, which prevent storm surges from touching human settlements. Measures that reduce 
sensitivity include a managed retreat of those settlements from the coast, or, addressing a 
different risk, developing drought-tolerant crop varieties for farmers. All of these measures 
directly address particular climate impacts and risks, and by addressing them, lower the 
corresponding damages and damage costs. The IPCC framing of vulnerability, however, suggests 
that there is a third approach to adaptation that might make sense: improving a system’s 
adaptive capacity. An example of this would include making information about anticipated 
climate impacts, or adaptation best practices, available to stakeholders, such as with the planned 
European Climate-ADAPT Internet platform. Internet sites do nothing to stop floodwaters or help 
crops grow—they have no direct effect on the damages suffered from climate impacts—and yet 
they can help people better to help themselves. A focus on adaptive capacity is an indirect 
approach towards adaptation. The IPCC defines adaptive capacity in relation to climate change 
impacts as “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and 
extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with 
the consequences”. It is determined by available technologies, economic resources and their 
distribution, the structure of critical institutions, human capital, social capital, information and 
skills, and public awareness (Smit et al. 2001). Most assessments define adaptive capacity as the 
capability for planned adaptation, as autonomous adaptation is hardly graspable with available 
data and methods (e.g. Metzger and Schröter 2006, Lung et al. 2011). 
A great deal of literature in recent years has examined the drivers of adaptive capacity, and also 
the possible benefits of taking efforts to improve it. There have been numerous qualitative 
studies (e.g. Folke et al. 2002; Berry, Kiel, and Elliott 2002; Pelling and High 2005; Smit and 
Wandel 2006), and several quantitative ones (Brooks, Adger, and Kelly 2005; Yohe and Tol 2002; 
A. G. Patt et al. 2010). The results show that the elements of adaptive capacity are highly context 
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specific, not only geographically but also in terms of what climate risks are being addressed, and 
what elements of a human environment system are to be protected from those risks. The results 
also suggest that in some cases the benefits of measures to improve adaptive capacity may far 
outweigh the more direct approach of responding to climate impacts. Lutz et al. (in review), for 
example, suggested that continuing efforts to improve secondary school enrolment rates of girls 
in sub-Saharan Africa could save over 100,000 lives per year from climate related hazards; this is 
a number of lives far greater than would be protected by the infrastructure measures looked at 
by the World Bank in a recent study, measures that would come at a cost of $70 - $100 billion per 
year through 2050 (World Bank 2010). 
This report, however, is not intended to guide adaptation decision-making and appraisal in a 
developing country context such as sub-Saharan Africa, however, but in Europe, and that makes a 
difference. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, there are a great number of school-age girls who 
are not enrolled, whereas in Europe the number is very small. Thus for Europe, two questions 
arise. First, is attention to vulnerability, as distinct from impacts, relevant for the purposes of IA, 
EIA, and SEA? More specifically, is there reason to believe that there exists in Europe a deficit of 
adaptive capacity, significant enough in magnitude that policies that cure this deficit will make a 
meaningful contribution towards reduced climate damages? Second, to the extent that there do 
exist deficits in adaptive capacity in Europe, where are they, and how can they be assessed? 
7.2 Vulnerability in the European context 
Although the vulnerability of people, communities and sectors in developing countries has been 
the primary concern, developed countries also show a growing interest in vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity assessments. At the EU level this manifests itself in intensified research efforts 
e.g. ATEAM, ADAM, ESPON Climate, RESPONSES, MOVE; it shows in increased awareness of 
regional disparities in climate vulnerability across Europe in regional and cohesion policy, 
(European Commission 2008, 2010a) and climate policy (European Commission 2009). DG 
Climate Action defines the role of the EU as being to “ensure that disadvantaged regions and 
those most affected by climate change are capable of taking the necessary measures to adapt” 
(European Commission 2010b). 
The few pan-European vulnerability assessments use a refined version of the IPCC definition as 
their point of departure and conceptual framework, determining exposure and sensitivity based 
on comprehensive modelling results and adding a generic adaptive capacity indicator. Schröter et 
al. (2005, see also Metzger and Schröter 2006) conducted the first spatially explicit dynamic 
climate vulnerability assessment for Europe, focusing on human sectors at risk of ecosystem 
service loss. The purpose of this task was to provide decision support to stakeholders and 
decision-makers for the sustainable use of natural resources. The authors highlighted the 
importance of involving stakeholders throughout the assessment process to ensure the saliency 
and legitimacy of the results. This process rendered important insights on the usefulness of 
vulnerability assessment; most prominently the notion that stakeholders are more interested in 
impacts than in generic vulnerability assessments, and prefer to assess their own 
vulnerability/adaptive capacity (Metzger and Schröter 2006). The vulnerability maps which have 
been generated by the project may be helpful in anticipating vulnerability of sectors concerning 
different ecosystem services and thus serve as a basis for planning adaptation strategies. 
Ultimately, decisions require additional localized and context-specific information (Schröter et al. 
2005). 
Lung et al. (2011) developed a set of hazard-specific impact indicators for floods, droughts, heat 
waves and forest fires in Europe at NUTS II level. Based on the assessment the authors identified 
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hotspots of vulnerability to natural disasters that were then compared to European infrastructure 
investment for adaptation across regions. The objectives of the assessment were mostly science 
driven, although the authors proposed implications for the development of the ongoing EU 
adaptation strategy and pan-European adaptation funding and mainstreaming. The results were 
presented to European and national-level stakeholders in a workshop. The participants found the 
results interesting on a general comparative level, but had reservations concerning: (1) the 
attribution of impacts to climate change, as well as (2) the additionality of measures that might 
have been taken anyway in the absence of explicit climate adaptation efforts and (3) the 
subjectivity of the choices made to define adaptive capacity and in turn vulnerability (Hanger et 
al. 2011). 
Greiving et al. (2011), provide a general vulnerability assessment for European regions at the 
NUTS III level, to serve as a basis for a cohesive European territorial development policy, 
responsive to climate change. The special features of this analysis are the comparably high 
spatial resolution and the verification and validation of the pan-European results with in-depth 
case studies at regional and local levels. While the case studies largely confirmed the findings of 
the pan-European assessment, they highlighted the scale dependency of such endeavours and the 
fact that large-scale assessment blurs much of the regional and local specificity. Although the 
importance of stakeholder involvement was highlighted, no such process was consistently 
applied throughout the study. 
More regional, local and or sector-specific studies lack comparability, but provide more context-
specific, place-based and qualitative data, which is important for decision-making. Such examples 
also reflect the diversity of available vulnerability and adaptive capacity assessments in the 
context of climate change. 
Holmann and Næss (2009) compare the effectiveness of vulnerability assessment approaches 
conducted in England and Norway. The authors emphasize differences based on the driving 
forces behind those assessments – stakeholders in the case of England and scientists in the case 
of Norway - and the level of awareness of adverse effects of climate change, which was much 
higher in England than in Norway. Indeed, Norway is generally considered to be among the least 
vulnerable and most resilient countries in the world. However, O’Brien et al. (2004a) conducting 
assessments on multiple scales, reveal climate vulnerability for certain regions, sectors and social 
groups across the country; highlighting thus the scale-dependency of vulnerability assessments. 
Also in a Nordic country, Glass et al. (2010) investigated how institutional determinants influence 
adaptive capacity in Sweden and what role vulnerability management plays in local political 
agendas.  The authors conclude that vulnerability management involves mostly technological and 
reactive fixes, but missing are institutional knowledge, and local cooperation and coordination 
which could enhance institutional responses. 
Kruse et al. (2011) assessed the vulnerability to climate change of the tourism sector in the Alps. 
The study was conducted to validate the pan-European vulnerability study by Greiving et al. 
(2011) and to explore aspects of adaptive capacity that may not be grasped at the European 
scale, such as cultural and institutional factors. This was achieved via a questionnaire that was 
designed according to the IPCC definition of vulnerability and adaptive capacity and distributed 
to relevant actors in the region, who answered based on their own opinion and judgment. The 
results showed significant disparities in awareness and available institutional knowledge across 
the region and is proposed to serve as a benchmark for local adaptation decision-making and 
improvement for adaptive capacity. 
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To date neither climate vulnerability nor adaptive capacity are explicitly included in any of the 
obligatory impact assessments prescribed by the EU (IA of EU policies, SEA and EIA for plans, 
programmes and projects). Furthermore, evidence that the inclusion of vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity assessments could be problematic shows in the discussion of scientific output with 
policy makers and stakeholders. Results from RESPONSES Work Package 6 suggest that 
integrating yet another aspect into obligatory environmental impact assessments might go 
beyond the capacities of those authorities who are required to implement them. 
7.3 Key insights from the RESPONSES Project 
Insight 1: Vulnerability reduction is less important in the European context than it is 
globally 
Vulnerabilities of human-environment systems are much more salient in developing countries, 
where larger parts of the population rely on climate-sensitive sectors for their livelihoods and 
general adaptive capacity is significantly lower than in developed countries. Adaptive capacity 
cannot be seen exclusively in the context of climate change, but is a dynamic concept that may 
be depleted or enhanced by multiple stressors (O’Brien 2004a), and is thus inherently linked to 
wider issues of development. 
Vulnerability and adaptive capacity are linked to immense inherent uncertainties and 
complexities (Patt et al. 2005a) and moreover are subject to extensive value judgments which in 
turn may be cause for conflict (O’Brien and Wolf 2010). These concepts should thus not be 
employed lightly. In the European context adaptive capacity, in all the ways in which it has been 
assessed, is much higher than in the developing world. Disparities exist across the continent but 
are significantly less pronounced. Given the reluctance of stakeholders to engage in assessments 
of vulnerability and adaptive capacity (Metzger and Schröter 2006) it seems these tools are of 
much less immediate importance than impact assessments, which are applied widely across 
countries and regions, for example to inform adaptation planning and the development of 
national adaptation strategies (Hanger et al. 2012). 
Insight 2: Adaptive capacity and sensitivity vary across regions  
In the light of the EU’s key objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion, it is important 
to highlight disparities in vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Such pan-European assessments 
may guide EU policy development in general and adaptation and regional development in 
particular. Given uncertainties and value judgments in the selection of indicators it is important 
that not one single assessment, but multiple assessments from different sources, are used. Pan-
European assessments, such as the assessment by Lung et al. (2011), help to identify 
vulnerability hotspots, which deserve extraordinary attention, especially at national and sub-
national levels. 
Recent work within the MEDIATION project, in particular, has identified some critical deficits of 
adaptive capacity at the national level, in terms of the capacities of decision-makers to make 
adaptation decisions informed by the best science, and to implement them to manage climate 
risks (Pfenninger et al. 2011). This is particularly the case in the newer EU member states, where 
government bureaucracies are still going through substantial growing pains. First, there is a 
tremendous degree of inequality among member states with respect to the amount of climate 
research that they fund domestically. Countries such as the UK and Germany have large research 
budgets, and a result of this a great deal of research, conducted at some of the leading research 
centres in the world, is focusing on the particular climate impacts and risks that their citizens 
face. Other member states, such as Romania, rely primarily on EU-funded research to find these 
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things out. That research is less focused on the specific impacts facing citizens there, and is 
often conducted by foreign researchers, less familiar with the local contexts within which impacts 
are felt. Second, there is a high degree of inequality with respect to the degree of policy 
integration that has taken place (Jordan and Lenschow 2010). While the implementation of 
successful adaptation strategies often requires close communication across government 
ministries handling different policy sectors—from education to agriculture to disaster 
management—this is often lacking.  
At the EU level, then, policy appraisal such as IA can take into account whether a given option has 
the effect of improving the state of specific climate knowledge for a particular member state, and 
also improving the level of policy integration in that country, especially for those countries where 
these aspects are problematic. 
Insight 3: Local decision making capacities often matter 
The third insight is that at the local level there may be pockets of low adaptive capacity that 
simply have not appeared in the literature to date. Many of the studies that have occurred have 
been at the national level, or have concentrated at the sub-national level on easily quantifiable 
indicators, such as income or education. But there have also been studies that have suggested 
locally-specific barriers to adaptation that may be particular important in some sectors. Several 
studies of the European wine industry, for example, have shown how the small-scale wine 
producers are often constrained in terms of the specific varieties that they can grow, whether 
because of rules prohibiting them from moving into new varieties, or because if they do so they 
will lose the benefits of varietal-specific certifications of origin (Battaglini, Barbeau, et al. 2009; 
Holland and Smit 2010). These are issues that would not be picked up by the studies that focus 
primarily on indicators. 
In the context of SEA and EIA, both of which operate at the national or sub-national level, it may 
be worth considering whether there are particular factors constraining adaptation, either 
generally or in specific economic sectors, and whether the options under consideration would 
have the effect of augmenting or overcoming these barriers. 
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